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This study investigates the role of subordinate managers in monitoring myopic 
CEOs’ actions to mitigate the earnings management practices. Subordinate managers 
have longer horizon in the firm compared to the CEO and they have the power to 
withdraw their contributions to the firm, which will negatively affect the generation of 
cash flow in the current period. In this study, the researcher uses the mean age difference 
between the top four subordinate managers and the incumbent CEO as a proxy for the 
difference in appropriation horizon between the CEO and his/her subordinates. The 
findings suggest that internal governance, exercised by subordinate managers, can reduce 
the earnings management of the firm. In addition, the researcher finds that as the CEO 
age (CEO horizon) increase (decrease); it is more likely that the CEO will manage 
earnings. Furthermore, the results show a negative relationship between subordinate 
managers’ power and earnings management. These results suggest that the powerful 
subordinate managers can provide effective monitoring to constrain and counterbalance 
the potential self-serving actions of the CEOs, otherwise, their ability to monitor the CEO 
is weak and internal governance would be less effective. Moreover, the researcher shows 
that internal monitoring is more effective in firms that require a higher degree of firm 
specific knowledge and skills. The findings are robust after controlling for other 
governance mechanisms and across different earnings management models and internal 
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Previous literature has used the term "internal governance" to describe different 
governance mechanisms such as board of directors, managerial incentives, and anti-
takeover provisions (Gillan, 2006). Despite the importance of corporate governance 
topic, previous studies almost ignore the oversight role of the insider stakeholders as an 
effective internal governance mechanism. Therefore, the main objective of this study is to 
emphasize the role of subordinate managers as an alternative governance mechanism to 
restraint self-interested behavior on the part of the CEO, who wants to extract the 
maximum possible rent at the expense of the other stakeholders (Acharya, Myers, & 
Rajan, 2011). In particular, this study examines the effectiveness of internal monitoring, 
exercised by non-CEO executives, in mitigating the earnings management practices. 
Background Information 
Since SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt's "Numbers Game" speech before the NYU 
Center for Law and Business in September 1998, a considerable attention from the 
public, regulators, and academia has been directed to earnings management practices.1 
Several empirical studies have identified a number of corporate events in which the 
managers have strong incentives to manage earnings in order to achieve their own 
interests rather than to reflect the real underlying financial performance of the firms.2 
This trend resulted in adverse consequences to the quality of earnings and the quality of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
1Levitt (1998) define earnings management as the gray area between legitimacy and outright 
fraud. 
2For example, management buyouts (Perry & Williams, 1994), initial public offerings (IPOs) 
(Teoh, Welch, &Wong, 1998a), and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) (Rangan, 1998; Teoh, Welch, 





the financial reporting system as a whole. In addition, such practices weaken the 
investors’ confidence toward the management team and the firm’s financial reports. 
Given the recent wave of accounting scandals that occurred in the international 
financial community, many criticisms of the financial reporting integrity have been raised 
(Agrawal & Chadha, 2005). These scandals have shown the necessity for major reforms 
in corporate governance structure to strengthen the control and monitor mechanisms. In 
this regard, a vast body of literature acknowledges the importance of different corporate 
governance mechanisms that might help to improve financial reporting quality. In 
particular, the link between corporate governance and earnings management practices has 
been strongly discussed to show that good corporate governance can reduce earnings 
management practices. Most of previous literature emphasis is placed on specific 
governance mechanisms such as board of directors and audit committee, ignoring the role 
of subordinate managers in monitoring the CEO (e.g., Abbott, Park, & Parker, 2000; 
Agrawal & Chadha, 2005; Beasley, 1996; Bedard, Chtourou, & Courteau, 2004; 
Davidson, Goodwin, & Kent, 2005; DeZoort & Salterio, 2001; Ebrahim, 2007; Klein, 
2002; Park & Shin, 2004; Peasnell, Pope, & Young, 2000; Xie, Davidson, & DaDalt, 
2003). 
However, an extensive number of studies on corporate governance suggest that 
these traditional governance mechanisms have limited impact on reducing the agency 
cost. For example, Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991) and Hill and Phan (1991) argue that 
CEOs strengthen their position with the board overtime, which in turn may allow them to 
circumvent board monitoring. In addition, Monks (2008) argue that shareholders have 





2004). Moreover, it is costly for institutional investors with short investment horizons to 
engage in monitoring activities in the firms (Burns, Kedia, & Lipson, 2010). 
Furthermore, Acharya et al. (2011) state that it is difficult for the operational decisions to 
be effectively controlled by the market. Moreover, Aggarwal, Fu, and Pan (2013) argue 
that strong or independent boards could be valuable in times of crises but are too far away 
from day-to-day operations to add much value to a firm. 
Therefore, the academic attention has been turned out to focus on the monitoring 
role of stakeholders inside the firm, subordinate managers. Subordinate managers, in 
turn, has a great opportunity to closely monitor CEOs on a daily basis, which is 
impossible to be fulfilled by the board that only meet a few times in a year, or even by 
any other traditional governance mechanism. In this regard, Cheng, Lee, and Shevlin 
(2012) define internal governance as the process through which key subordinate 
managers provide checks and balances on myopic CEOs. In addition, Aggarwal et al. 
(2013) argue that bottom-up pressure from subordinates may be as or more important 
than the more heavily studied top-down board governance mechanisms in mitigating 
agency problem. Similarly, Acharya et al. (2011) suggest that internal governance, 
exercised by subordinate managers, can mitigate agency problems and ensure that firms 
have substantial value even with little or no external governance by investors. They 
further suggest that internal governance can control CEO behavior even if shareholders 
are powerless and dispersed. Moreover, Landier, Sraer, Sauvagnat, and Thesmar (2012) 
document that monitoring by non-executive directors or monitoring by subordinates is to 





The strength of subordinate managers in monitoring the self-interested CEO 
comes from two sources, their incentive and power. First, subordinate managers have a 
desire to become the future CEO. Accordingly, their longer time horizon in the firm 
compared to the CEO direct their focus to the future of the firm instead of the short-term 
performance. This difference in appropriation horizons between the incumbent CEO and 
the subordinate managers is the fundamental source that driving internal governance. 
Second, if subordinate managers see that the CEO will leave nothing behind, they have 
power to withdraw their contributions to the firm (Acharya et al., 2011) or simply choose 
to be less enthusiastic in their work (Landier, Sraer, & Thesmar, 2009), which will 
negatively affect the generation of the current cash flows. Hence, the subordinate 
managers use their power to force the CEO to act in a more public-spirited and far-
sighted way. As a result, incumbent CEO commits to preserve value for the future of his 
young employee in the firm.  
Research Objectives and Questions 
This study extend prior literature by providing an empirical evidence that active 
monitoring from the subordinate managers can help to prevent the managerial 
opportunistic behavior on the part of the CEO and mitigate the earnings management 
practices. Accordingly, the following research questions for this study are devised:  
1) What is the relationship between CEO horizon and earnings management? 
2) Does internal governance measured by the difference in horizons between the 
CEO and subordinate managers decrease earnings management? 
3) What is the relationship between CEO’s power and earnings management? 





5) Does internal governance add value to the firm after controlling for other 
governance mechanisms? 
Research Methodology 
To answer the above questions, alternative measures of discretionary accruals as a 
proxy of earnings management are used. This study uses different versions of the Jones 
(1991) model, in which discretionary accruals is computed as the difference between total 
accruals and estimated nondiscretionary accruals. To proxy for the internal governance 
exercised by the subordinate managers, the researcher uses two distinct measures: 1) The 
mean relative age differences between the CEO and the top four subordinate managers to 
reflect the divergence in their horizons within the firm. 2) Following Bebchuk, Cremers, 
and Peyer (2011), the researcher uses the fraction of the aggregate compensation of the 
CEO relative to the total executives’ compensation (CPS ratio) to capture the relative 
importance of the CEO as well as the extent to which the CEO is able to extract rents. 
The researcher tests the hypothesis using 14,123 firm-year observations from the S&P 
1500 firms in the period 2000-2010. The researcher expects to find that a decrease in 
CEO horizon (increase in CEO’s age) is associated with an increase in earnings 
management practices. In addition, firms with larger difference in horizon between the 
CEO and the subordinate managers and firms with less CEO dominance are expected to 
have more effective internal governance and are less likely to engage in earnings 
management practices.  
Importance of the Study 
The empirical results are consistent with the researcher’s expectations. The 





management. In addition, the researcher finds that internal governance, measured by the 
difference in horizon between the CEO and subordinate managers, reduces the firm’s 
tendency to manage its earnings and the larger this difference is, the more effective the 
internal governance. These results are confirmed using the Bebchuk et al. (2011) CEO 
pay slice to measure the CEO power and dominance. The researcher finds that as the 
CEO’s power increases, the earnings management practices increase. These results hold 
after control other firm characteristics that might affect the extent of earnings 
management (e.g., age, size, growth opportunities, leverage revenue and firm’s cash 
flow). Moreover, the results are robust after controlling for other governance 
mechanisms. Furthermore, the findings indicate that internal governance is more effective 
for the firm’s where the value is more tied to firm-specific human capital. In this regard, 
the researcher uses Pantzalis and Park (2009) industrial rank of excess value of human 
capital to differentiate between human and non-human capital industries.  
Organization of the Study 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: chapter 2 discusses the 
various definitions and the empirical models of earnings management. Chapter 3 
discusses the definitions of corporate governance, investigates the impact of a firm's 
traditional corporate mechanisms on constraining earnings management, including audit 
committee and board of directors, and highlights the monitoring role of subordinate 
managers as an effective internal governance mechanism. Chapter 4 presents the 
hypotheses of the study. Chapter 5 describes the data and the measures of earnings 
management and internal governance. Chapter 6 outlines the main results. Chapter 7 






EARNINGS MANAGEMENT: DEFINITIONS AND MEASURES 
Introduction 
In his speech entitled "The Numbers Game," Arthur Levitt initiated a new focus 
on deceptive accounting practices in response to the market's increasing focus on 
corporate earnings (Arthur Levitt, 1998). Corporate earnings are believed to be the most 
important item in the financial statements because earnings represents a summary of a 
firm’s performance. Hence, earnings are supposed to convey valuable information to 
shareholders without requiring them to learn about the firm’s operation in detail, a 
process that would be costly and cumbersome and might expose proprietary information 
to competitors (Ronen & Yaari, 2008). Therefore, earnings are used by wide range of 
users. For example, investors concentrate on this bottom line with a particular attention 
paid to earnings per share (EPS). In addition, most analysts use earnings to analyze a 
company's performance. The expected value of a company's share price is the present 
value of all of its future earnings; therefore, a company’s value is closely related to the 
increase or decrease in the earnings.1 Furthermore, the managers are compensated 
explicitly (salary, bonus, stock options, etc.) and implicitly (job security, reputation, etc.) 
on the firm’s earnings.  
Consequently, managers have strong incentives to adjust earnings numbers to the 
desired level, given that the flexibility of the current financial reporting system provides 
them with considerable ability and opportunity to manipulate earnings. In this regard, Xie 
et al. (2003) argue that the nature of accrual accounting gives managers considerable 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
1 Francis, Schipper, and Vincent (2003) find that reported earnings numbers are more closely 





discretion in determining the earnings in any given period. Moreover, according to Teoh, 
Wong, and Rao (1998), within the boundary of GAAP, managers have several sources to 
manipulate earnings which, in turn, have the potential to undercut investor confidence in 
U.S. capital markets by destroying financial reporting transparency and reliability (Arthur 
Levitt, 1998). This chapter provides an overview of the earnings management's 
definitions and presents a review of the most popular models used in the literature to 
detect the presence of earnings management. 
Definitions of Earnings Management 
In both theory and practice, there is no widely accepted definition of earnings 
management; it is difficult to define and even more difficult to measure precisely. As a 
result, there is a growing debate among academics, regulators, and practitioners regarding 
the precise definition of earnings management. The Panel on Audit Effectiveness (2000) 
states that “[it] is not aware of a single accepted definition of the term earnings 
management" (p.77). However, a general understanding of earnings management 
involves a level of deception, usually done in order to influence some outcome. Scott 
(2003) states that earnings management is the choice made by a manager of accounting 
policies in order to achieve specific objectives. Similarly, Giroux (2004) defines earnings 
management as the planning and control of the accounting and reporting system to meet 
the personal objective of management. 
Probably the most cited definition for earnings management is the one suggested 
by Healy and Wahlen (1999). They state that 
Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting 
and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some 





influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers. 
(p.368) 
 
Healy and Wahlen (1999) demonstrate that there are many ways that managers 
can exercise judgment in financial reporting. Among others, estimating numerous future 
economic events, choosing among acceptable accounting methods for reporting the same 
economic transactions, exercising judgment in working capital management, choosing to 
make or defer expenditures, and deciding how to structure corporate transactions are 
possible ways to use judgment in financial reporting. They conclude that the main 
objective of earnings management is to mislead stakeholders about the underlying 
economic performance of the firm. This can arise if managers believe that at least some 
stakeholders will not undo earnings management. In other words, if managers have 
access to information that is unavailable to outside stakeholders and such earnings 
management is unlikely to be clear to outsiders.  
In their comprehensive review of the accounts manipulation literature, Stlowy and 
Breton (2004) use an all-inclusive term, "accounts manipulation," which they define as: 
"The use of management’s discretion to make accounting choices or to design 
transactions so as to affect the possibilities of wealth transfer between the company and 
society (political costs), funds providers (cost of capital) or managers (compensation 
plans)" (p.6). In the first two cases, the firm benefits from the wealth transfer. However, 
in the third case, managers are acting against the firm. Their framework is based on the 
possibility of wealth transfer from one stakeholder to another that might impact 
information asymmetry between managers and the other categories of stakeholders. In 





and the debt/equity ratio. Earnings per share can be manipulated in two ways: first, by 
adding or removing certain revenues or expenses, and second, by presenting an item 
before or after the profit used to calculate the earnings per share. The debt/equity ratio 
can be modified by artificially inflating the profit or by hiding certain financing through 
off-balance sheet financing devices. Figure 1 presents Stlowy and Breton's framework for 
the different types of accounts manipulation: earnings management, income smoothing, 
big bath accounting, and creative accounting.  
Stlowy and Breton (2004) argue that manipulation is not fraud. The activities 
covered by the terms "earnings management" or generally "creative accounting" normally 
remain within the law. However, they contend that compliance with standards is not an 
assurance that financial statements present the financial situation of the firm fairly 
because they don't fall into the "fair presentation" zone, as shown in Figure 2. In this 
regard, Shah (1996) proposes a new concept –creative compliance– to describe the 
capacity of creative accounting to remain within the limits of the law while bending its 






Figure 1. Stlowy and Breton's framework for the different types of accounts    




Figure 2. Accounts manipulation and fair presentation. Source: Stlowy, H., and Breton, 
G. (2004, p. 11). 
 
Similarly, Schipper (1989) defines earnings management as: "A purposeful 





private gain. A minor extension of this definition would encompass ‘real’ earnings 
management, accomplished by timing investment or financing decisions to alter reported 
earnings or some subset of it" (p.92). 
In addition, the definition of earnings management given by Davidson, Stickney, 
and Weil (1987), as cited in Schipper (1989), is "The process of taking deliberate steps 
within the constraints of generally accepted accounting principles to bring about a desired 
level of reported earnings" (p.92). 
Moreover, Fischer and Rosenzweig (1995) define earnings management as 
referring to the actions of a manager which serve to increase (decrease) the current 
reported earnings of the unit for which the manager is responsible without generating a 
corresponding increase (decrease) in the long-term economic profitability of the unit. 
Such actions can be classified into two types: 1) Actions involve changing accounting 
methods, for example, adjusting the amounts of reserves, thereby changing reported net 
income, and 2) Actions involve operating decisions like offering special terms to 
customers at year-end to advance sales from next year to this year. In this way, Fischer 
and Rosenzweig (1995) assure that earnings management is contrary to the "Standards of 
Ethical Conduct for Management Accountants." 
Contrary to the above definitions, which imply that the main purpose of earnings 
management is to mislead users to achieve specific objectives, Dechow and Skinner 
(2000) criticize these definitions, as they are difficult to operationalize directly using 
attributes of reported accounting numbers since they center on managerial intent, which 
is unobservable. They differentiate between fraudulent accounting practices (that clearly 





GAAP and which may comprise earnings management depending on managerial intent. 
They developed Figure 3, which identifies three types of accounting choices by 
management that would not violate GAAP – "conservative" accounting, "neutral" 
accounting, and "aggressive" accounting. Choices beyond "aggressive" accounting 
violate GAAP and become "fraudulent" accounting, which clearly demonstrates the intent 
to deceive. However, they indicate that even in the case of aggressive accounting choices, 
it is difficult to differentiate between abusive earnings management and the legitimate 
exercise of accounting discretion without identifying the managerial intent of 
manipulating earnings. The basic principle of Figure 3 is in line with Figure 2 in the 
sense that accounts manipulation remains within the limits of GAAP while fraud is 
outside of these limits. 
Furthermore, Giroux (2004) argues that earnings management includes the whole 
spectrum, from conservative accounting through fraud, which is a huge range of 
accounting judgment, given the incentives of management. Consistent with this view, the 
Panel on Audit Effectiveness (2000) describes earnings management as “a continuum 







Figure 3. The distinction between fraud and earnings management. Source: Dechow, P. 
M., & Skinner, D. J. (2000, p. 239). 
 
Moreover, Ronen and Yaari (2008) state that earnings management can be loosely 
defined as a strategy of generating accounting earnings, which, according to Phillips, 
Pincus, and Rego (2003), “is accomplished through managerial discretion over 
accounting choices and operating cash flows”. Ronen and Yaari (2008) argue that 
 Earnings management is an umbrella for acts that affect the reported accounting 
earnings or their interpretation, starting from production and investment decisions 
that partly determine the underlying economic earnings, going through the choice 
of accounting treatment and the size of accruals when preparing the periodic 
reports, and ending in actions that affect the interpretation of the reported 
earnings, such as presenting non-GAAP earnings (commonly known as pro forma 
earnings). (p.XIV)  
 
They classify earnings management activities as white, gray or black in terms of 
their perceived transparency and intended purposes. Ronen and Yaari (2008) define 





choice of accounting treatment to signal the manager’s private information on future cash 
flows” (p.25), pernicious (black) earnings management as “the practice of using tricks to 
misrepresent or reduce transparency of the financial reports,” and gray earnings 
management as “choosing an accounting treatment that is either opportunistic 
(maximizing the utility of management only) or economically efficient.” As a result, 
earnings management can be beneficial when it signals long-term value, pernicious when 
it conceals short- or long-term value or neutral when it reveals the short-term truth. 
Measures of Earnings Management 
All publicly traded companies are required under GAAP to use accrual-basis 
accounting to keep track of business expenses and income.2 This is so that they can 
comply with the revenue recognition and matching principles, which provides a more 
accurate picture of how a business is performing over the long-term than does the cash 
basis model. In this regard, Dechow and Skinner (2000) state that “accrual accounting 
tends to dampen the fluctuations in an entity's underlying cash flows to generate a 
number that is more useful to investors (for assessing economic performance and 
predicting future cash flows) than current-period operating cash flows” (p.238). 
However, this discretion can be used by management in two ways: they can use their 
discretion to signal their private information about firm performance or they can use it to 
opportunistically manipulate earnings.  
Beginning with Healy (1985), studies have turned to accruals-based measures to 
estimate the degree of earnings management. An important advantage of the accrual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
2 According to the FASB, 1985, SFAC No. 6, para. 139, “Accrual accounting attempts to record 
the financial effects on an entity of transactions and other events and circumstances that have cash 
consequences for the entity in the periods in which those transactions, events, and circumstances occur 





approach is that it may reveal subtle income-reducing techniques that managers have 
incentives to employ because such techniques are less subject to detection by outsiders. 
The accrual approach also captures the effect of accounting estimates, changes in those 
estimates, and changes in accounting methods (DeAngelo, 1986).  
The research design of the accruals-based models is based on isolating the total 
accruals into discretionary accruals and nondiscretionary accruals.3 Elgers, Pfeiffer, and 
Porter (2003) argue that “A fundamental issue in assessing earnings management is the 
unobservability of the managed and un-managed components of reported earnings” 
(p.406). Consistent with this view, the earnings management literature has followed 
several approaches, with varying characteristics, to estimate the discretionary part. In this 
respect, three research designs are commonly used in the literature: those based on 
aggregate accruals, those based on specific accruals, and those based on the distribution 
of earnings after management. 
1) The Approach of Aggregate Accruals Models 
This approach attempts to identify discretionary accruals based on the relation 
between total accruals and hypothesized explanatory factors. Models that follow this 
approach range from the simple, in which total accruals are used as a measure of 
discretionary accruals, to the relatively sophisticated (regression), which decompose 
accruals into discretionary and nondiscretionary components (Bartov, Gul, & Tsui, 2001). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
3 Nondiscretionary accruals are accruals that arise from transactions made in the current period 
that are normal for the firm given its performance level and business strategy, industry conventions, macro-
economic events, and other economic factors. Discretionary accruals are accruals that arise from 







The six most popular models are Healy (1985), DeAngelo (1986), Jones (1991), 
Modified Jones Model by Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995), Kang and 
Sivaramakrishnan (1995) Model, and the Industry Model by Dechow and Sloan (1991). 
Table 2.1 describes these aggregate accruals estimation approaches and indicates their 
proxies for earnings management. 
 
Table 2.1 
The Six Most Popular Aggregate Accruals Models and Their Proxies for Earnings 
Management 
 
Authors  Discretionary accrual proxy  
Healy (1985) Total accruals  
DeAngelo (1986) Change in total accruals  
Jones (1991) Residual from regression of total accruals on change in sales 
and on property, plant and equipment 
Modified Jones Model 
from Dechow et al. 
(1995) 
Residual from regression of total accruals on change in sales 
and on property, plant and equipment, where revenue is 




Residual from a regression of noncash current assets less 
liabilities on lagged levels of these balances, adjusted for 
increases in revenues, expenses and plant and equipment 
Dechow and Sloan 
(1991) 
Residual from regression of total accruals on the median value 
of total accruals, scaled by lagged assets, for all firms in the 
same industry and year 
 
 
Adapted from: McNichols (2000, p.317). 
 
The Healy Model 
Healy (1985) develops an empirical approach that estimates the extent of earnings 





that total accruals aggregate discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals4, he implicitly 
assumes that the expected total accruals would be zero in the absence of earnings 
manipulation. Using this assumption, he does not incorporate any determinants of 
nondiscretionary accruals and his model assumes that nondiscretionary accruals follow a 
mean reverting process; the sales generation process is mean reverting with zero growth. 
Hence, nondiscretionary accruals = zero and discretionary accruals = total accruals. 
The Healy's model assumption that there are no nondiscretionary accruals during 
the estimation period has been criticized because nondiscretionary accruals are expected 
to change with firms’ underlying business activities (Kaplan, 1985 and McNichols, 
2000). Hence, nondiscretionary accruals are not expected to be zero in any given period. 
In addition, total accruals might be systematically negative for many companies, even in 
cases of absent systematic income manipulation. In this case, the empirical evidence that 
total accruals are less than zero could generate an erroneous inference that managers had 
deliberately understated earnings, when the correct explanation is that total accruals 
normally contain a (material) negative nondiscretionary component, depreciation expense 
(DeAngelo, 1986). 
The DeAngelo Model 
This model compares accruals in a test period with accruals in a benchmark 
period. The model attributes the deviations in accruals from the benchmark period to 
discretionary accruals with an assumption that the average change in nondiscretionary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
4 Healy (1985) states that “Total accruals include both discretionary and nondiscretionary 
components, and are estimated by the difference between reported accounting earnings and cash flows from 





accruals is approximately zero. The assumption that nondiscretionary accruals are 
constant is known as the “random walk” assumption.  
However, Friedlan (1994) assumes that the random walk assumption is not valid 
for growing firms because the growth would affect certain aspects of firms' operations 
including accruals. In this case, changes in total accruals that are considered discretionary 
may in fact be due to changes in nondiscretionary accruals caused by growth. This may 
lead to incorrect conclusion about the exercise of accounting discretion by preparers of 
financial statements. To control for the effect of growth on total accruals, Friedlan 
assumes a constant proportionality between total accruals and sales in successive periods. 
As a result, the amount of total accruals that is attributable to discretion is the difference 
between total accruals in the test period standardized by sales in the test period and total 




𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠  !"#!  !"#$%&  
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠  !"#!  !"#$%&  
−   
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠  !"#$!!"#$  !"#$%&  
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠  !"#$!!"#$  !"#$%&  
 
Friedlan proposes an alternate model for estimating discretionary accruals, namely to 
standardize by change in sales rather than by the sales level. Friedlan argues that the 
change in sales is a more appropriate deflator because the change in accruals that is 
related to changes in current operating accounts is proportional to the change in sales, not 
to the sales level. Formally,  
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦  𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠  ! =   
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠  !
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠  ! −   𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠  !!!
−   
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠  !!!







The Jones Model 
To partition total accruals into their managed (DA) and unmanaged (NDA) 
components, Jones (1991) implies an event study, assuming that firms do not manage 
earnings before the event (Import relief investigation in her case). Therefore, the time 
series of a firm’s earnings can be decomposed in to two sub-periods, an estimation period 
in which discretionary accruals = zero and the event period. Therefore, Jones (1991) uses 
a two-stage approach. In the first stage, the estimation period, wherein the coefficients of 
the nondiscretionary accruals are determined, total accruals are regressed on two 
variables: 1) The change in sales (∆REV) to control for the changes in nondiscretionary 
accruals caused by the changes in underlying economic activities, because revenues 
represent a reasonably objective measure of the firms' operations, and 2) The gross level 
of property, plant, and equipment (PPE) to control for nondiscretionary accruals 
associated with the depreciation expense. Therefore, nondiscretionary accruals is 
computed as indicated below to yield estimates of the coefficient 𝛼!, 𝛽!!  , 𝛽!!  : 
𝑇𝐴!"/𝐴!"!! = 𝛼! 1/  𝐴!"!! + 𝛽!!   ∆  𝑅𝐸𝑉!"  /  𝐴!"!!   + 𝛽!! 𝑃𝑃𝐸!"  /𝐴!"!!   +   𝜀!"     
Where 
𝑇𝐴!"= Total accruals for firm i in year t5 
𝐴!"!!  = Lagged assets of firm i 
∆  REV = Change in revenues 
PPE = Gross property, plant, and equipment 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
5  The total accruals (TA) are computed from the balance sheet as follows: TA = (∆ Current Assets 
- ∆ Cash) – (∆ Current Liabilities - ∆ Current maturities of long-term debt - ∆ Income taxes payable) - 
Depreciation and Amortization Expense, where all variables are deflated by the beginning of the year assets 
to overcome heteroskedasticity. This function is based on the understanding that working-capital accruals 





In the second stage, the event period, wherein the discretionary accruals are 
isolated in order to test for earnings management, the estimated parameters from the 
above regression, namely 𝛼!, 𝛽!!  , 𝛽!!  , are combined with TA, ∆REV and PPE data from 
the event year to estimate the nondiscretionary accruals (NDA), and the residual accruals 
are the discretionary component (DA) of total accruals as follows: 
𝑁𝐷𝐴!" = 𝛼! 1  /  𝐴!"!! + 𝛽!!   ∆  𝑅𝐸𝑉!" /𝐴!"!! +   𝛽!!    𝑃𝑃𝐸!"  /𝐴!"!!  
𝐷𝐴!" = 𝑇𝐴!" - 𝑁𝐷𝐴!" 
Where 
𝑁𝐷𝐴!"= Nondiscretionary accruals of firm i in period t 
 𝐷𝐴!"= Discretionary accruals of firm i in period t 
The Modified Jones Model 
Dechow et al. (1995) propose a modified version of the standard Jones model, 
known as DSS. They argue that a weakness of the standard Jones model lies in its 
implicit assumption that changes in all revenues are nondiscretionary accruals. Therefore, 
DSS is identical to the standard Jones model, with the exception that the change in 
revenues is reduced by the change in receivables in the event period. This assumption 
stems from the fact that it is easier for managers to manage earnings by exercising 
discretion over the recognition of revenue on credit sales rather than over the recognition 
of revenue on cash sales.6 Hence, the difference in the modified model lies in the second 
stage (the event period), where nondiscretionary accruals (NDA) are computed by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
6	  As cited by Beneish (1998), “Beneish (1997) finds that cash sales are rarely manipulated. He 
reports that one firm out of 64 (1.6%) engages in circular transfers of money to create the impression of 
receivable collection. In contrast, 43 of 64 firms (67.2%) engage in manipulations affecting credit sales 
(e.g., fictitious invoices, front loading with a right of return, keeping books open past the end of the fiscal 





multiplying the estimated coefficient of the change in sales (first stage) by the change in 
cash sales (the change in revenues minus the change in accounts receivable). The NDA of 
firm i in the event period (second stage) are computed as follows: 
𝑁𝐷𝐴!" = 𝛼! 1  /  𝐴!"!! + 𝛽!!   ∆  𝑅𝐸𝑉!" −   ∆  𝐴𝑅!" /𝐴!"!! +   𝛽!!    𝑃𝑃𝐸!"  /𝐴!"!!  
Where 
∆ AR = Change in accounts receivable 
𝛽!!  = The coefficient of total revenues in the estimation period. It is estimated from the 
regression of accruals on ∆ 𝑅𝐸𝑉! and  𝑃𝑃𝐸!  . 
To summarize, the original Jones model implicitly assumes that discretion is not 
exercised over revenue either in the estimation period or in the event period; whereas the 
modified version of the Jones model implicitly assumes that all changes in credit sales in 
the event period (the change in receivables) are the result of earnings management 
activities. However, Kothari (2001) argue that this approach would be misspecified for 
firms experiencing substantial growth and, accordingly, experiencing real increases in 
receivables that is not necessarily earnings management. Thus, these firms will likely 
underestimate nondiscretionary accruals and overestimate discretionary accruals. 
Different Versions of Jones and Modified Jones Model 
a) Cross-Sectional Version of Jones and Modified Jones Models  
The Jones (1991) and Dechow et al. (1995) models were originally introduced as 
time series models. However, DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) propose a cross-sectional 
Jones model rather than a time series model and many recent studies have used this cross 
sectional version of both models. In this regard, Peasnell et al. (2000a) remark that  
The original time series formulation of the standard Jones and modified Jones 





because of the need for a sufficiently long time-series of data to allow for the 
effective estimation of the regression parameters. This requirement raises several 
concerns. First, issues of survivorship bias naturally arise. Secondly, the 
assumption that the coefficient estimates on ∆REV and PPE remain stationary 
over time may not be appropriate. Finally, the self-reversing property of accruals 
may introduce specification problems in the form of serially correlated residuals.7 
(p.315)  
 
Both the cross-sectional Jones and modified Jones models are similar to their 
original models, except that the parameters of the models are estimated by using cross-
sectional data rather than time-series data. Therefore, parameter estimates are industry 
and year-specific rather than firm specific. Under this approach, the first-stage regression 
is estimated separately for each industry-year combination, after which the resulting 
industry- and time-specific parameter estimates are combined with firm-specific data to 
generate estimated discretionary accruals. 
However, because industry-level controls include the average level of discretion 
exercised by the industry, the benchmark for each firm's accruals is the behavior of the 
other firms in the sample and, in turn, the magnitude of nondiscretionary accruals may be 
overstated and the magnitude of discretionary accruals may be understated (McNichols, 
2000). Moreover, Peasnell et al. (2000a) argue that cross sectional models are less likely 
to capture the effects of (a) mean reversion in accruals, (b) dynamic accrual management 
strategies, and (c) industry-wide earnings management.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
7 McNichols (2000) mentions that “most studies impose the requirement that sample firms have at 
least 10 years of data, which poses two problems: First, one must exclude firms that do not have a sufficient 
data series in COMPUSTAT or other data sources. This leads to potentially smaller samples, and their 
representativeness is an open question. Second, it is not clear that sample firms have no incentive to 





b) Current Version of Jones and Modified Jones Models 
The existence of depreciation in Jones and Modified Jones models has been 
criticized by several studies. For example, Ronen and Yaari (2008) argue that the 
negative depreciation accruals dominate the sign of total accruals and, as cited in their 
book, Barth, Cram, and Nelson (2001) find that although accounts receivable and 
accounts payable are 1% of average assets (beginning assets plus ending assets divided 
by 2), depreciation amounts to five times that much. In addition, Young (1999) reports 
that Jones models based on a measure of total accruals (i.e., inclusive of the depreciation 
charge) induce substantial measurement error in the resulting estimate of managed 
accruals. Moreover, Beneish (1998) finds that  
Managing earnings via depreciation is either transparent or economically 
implausible. Transparent, because the effect of changes in useful lives or in the 
depreciation methods is a required disclosure. Implausible, if timing capital 
expenditures to make earnings management through depreciation less transparent, 
implies that managers forego profitable opportunities. (p.211)  
 
Beneish (1998) adds “Given the availability of alternative ways to manage 
earnings, I am not sure whether the benefits of managing earnings through depreciation 
are sufficient to warrant deviations from rational investment behavior” (p.211). As a 
result, another version of the Jones and modified Jones models uses current accruals (CA) 
as a dependent variable and only the change in revenues as the explanatory variable, 
omitting the PP&E regressor as follows:  
𝐶𝐴!"/𝐴!"!! = 𝛼! 1/  𝐴!"!! + 𝛽!!   ∆  𝑅𝐸𝑉!"  /  𝐴!"!!   + 𝜀!"     
Where 𝐶𝐴!"= Current accruals for firm i in year t, and is measured as the change in non-
cash working capital, (∆ Current Assets - ∆ Cash) – (∆ Current Liabilities - ∆ Current 





In this regard, Sloan (1996) reports that most of the variation in total accruals is 
driven by current accruals. Furthermore, Jones (1999) finds that the current accruals 
measure provides a more accurate basis for estimating discretionary behavior than does 
the total accruals measure, because the estimated discretionary portion of noncurrent 
accruals is less likely to reflect year-specific discretion. Hence, in some cases, the 
empiricist chooses to restrict attention to short-term accruals and omits the long-run 
accrual of depreciation.  
The Kang and Sivaramakrishnan Model 
Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995) find that previous studies suffer from three 
main problems, any of which could lead to reduced statistical power and erroneous 
inferences regarding earnings management. First, the variables used to predict 
unmanaged accruals themselves may not be free of earnings management. Second, the 
simultaneity and errors-in-variables problems may affect the estimated coefficients and 
standard errors. Finally, there is an omitted variables problem, as these studies do not 
control for unmanaged accruals related to cost of goods sold and other expenses.  
To overcome the above problems, Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995) propose an 
approach that improves their ability to infer the presence or absence of earnings 
management in context-specific cases. Their approach mitigates the simultaneity and 
errors-in-variable problems by employing both the standard instrumental variables (IV) 
method and Hansen's (1982) generalized method of moment (GMM) procedure, thereby 
mitigating the omitted variables problem and the related biases by using all major 
components of income as regressors, not only sales, but also cost of goods sold and other 





1) It includes cost of goods sold as well as other expenses, 2) It uses account balances as 
opposed to changes in these balances8, and 3) It does not require the regressors to be 
uncontaminated because they use an IV approach. 
The Industry Model 
The industry model is proposed by Dechow and Sloan (1991). They base their 
research design on the assumption that the variation in the determinants of 
nondiscretionary accruals is common across all firms in the same industry. This industry 
model for nondiscretionary accruals is as follows:  
𝑁𝐷𝐴!" =   𝛾! +   𝛾!  𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛   𝑇𝐴!"  /𝐴!"!!  
Where 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛   𝑇𝐴!"  /𝐴!"!!  is the median value of total accruals, scaled by lagged 
assets, for firms in the same industry and year. 
One advantage of this approach is that the researcher does not have to formulate a 
model of how the normal item under investigation (R&D in their case) behaves. In this 
regard, they state that they have no explicit theory regarding the expected level of R&D 
expenditures in the absence of manipulation. Instead, this approach considers the 
difference in total accruals between a firm with incentives to manage earnings and its 
colleagues that lack these incentives.  
However, Ronen and Yaari (2008) argue that there are two disadvantages 
associated with this approach:  
First, the model applies only to event studies in which not all firms experience the 
same event. Second, even if not all firms in the industry have the same incentives 
to manage earnings, if other firms in the industry also manage earnings in the 
same direction, the test biases against finding earnings management, and if other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
8 They use the account balance based approach because in the IV framework, instruments that are 






firms manage earnings in the opposite direction, the test might indicate non-
existent earnings management. (p.403) 
 
2) The Approach of Specific Accruals Models 
A second approach in the literature is to model a specific accrual or a set of 
specific accruals that has been chosen because it is sizable, has a material impact on 
reported earnings, and can be manipulated legally within the boundaries of GAAP, since 
it requires substantial judgment. Beneish (2001) argues that "The difficulties faced by 
aggregate accrual models suggest that studies of specific accruals, perhaps even case 
studies, are needed" (p.12). In addition, standards setters are more likely to be interested 
in understanding which specific accruals are used for earnings management (Healy & 
Wahlen, 1999). 
As with aggregate accruals studies, the research design task is to model the 
behavior of each specific accrual to identify its discretionary and nondiscretionary 
components. For example, McNichols and Wilson (1988) examine one accrual account, 
the provision for bad debts.9 This focus restricts their sample to industries where such an 
expense is material. The sample includes 289 firm-years from the 1967–1985 period, 
from printing and publishing (SIC 27, 37 firms), non-durable wholesale goods (SIC 50, 
51 firms) and business services (SIC 73, 29 firms). The mean ratio of receivables to total 
assets is 28.7% in the sample, as compared to 22.3% for the Compustat population as a 
whole. McNichols and Wilson (1988) explore the association between the abnormal 
expense and earnings (deflated by end-of-the-period assets to yield ROA), given the 
incentives of managers who receive earnings-based bonuses to manage earnings through 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
9 Under the generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), the provision for bad debts should 





the bad-debt expense. They test whether firms smooth out earnings via this expense (the 
smoothing hypothesis) or whether, similar to the dynamics in Healy (1985), they take a 
bath when earnings are either extremely low or extremely high (the bonus hypothesis). 
Moreover, Teoh, Wong, and Rao (1998) examine depreciation estimates and bad debt 
provisions surrounding initial public offerings. They find that, relative to a matched 
sample of non-IPO firms, sample firms are more likely to have income-increasing 
depreciation policies and bad debt allowances in the IPO year and for several subsequent 
years. 
In addition to these studies, several studies have focused on specific industries in 
which a single accrual is expected to be very material and requires substantial judgment. 
Specifically, studies of bank “loan loss provisions” in the banking industry include, for 
example, Beaver, Eger, Ryan, and Wolfson (1989), Moyer (1990), Scholes, Wilson, and 
Wolfson (1990), Wahlen (1994), Beatty, Chamberlain, and Magliolo (1995), Collins, 
Shackelford, and Wahlen (1995), Beaver and Engel (1996), Liu and Ryan (1995) and 
Liu, Ryan, and Wahlen (1997). Moreover, studies of property-casualty insurance claim 
loss reserves include, for example, Petroni (1992), Anthony and Petroni (1997), Beaver 
and McNichols (1998), Penalva (1998), and Petroni, Ryan, and Wahlen (2000). Other 
studies of earnings management use specific accruals have examined deferred tax 
valuation allowances, such as, Visvanathan (1998), Miller and Skinner (1998), and Ayers 
(1998). The results of these studies are mixed. There is some evidence that some firms 
use loan loss provisions and claim loss reserves to manage earnings, particularly to meet 
bank and insurance regulatory requirements, however, there is a little evidence that firms 





1999). A distinctive feature of each of the above studies is the use of GAAP to specify 
what the nondiscretionary component of an accrual should be and relate the difference to 
earnings management practices. 
In contrast to the above studies, Beneish (1997) develops a model based on 
several specific accruals, such as receivables, inventory and accounts payable, focusing 
on firms from a number of industries. He uses a sample of firms identified by the SEC as 
GAAP violators to calibrate alternative measures of earnings management. Furthermore, 
Marquardt and Wiedman (2004) empirically examine the use of specific accrual accounts 
in managing earnings under three different earnings management contexts: equity 
offerings, management buyouts, and firms avoiding earnings decreases. They first 
document the presence of earnings management in each setting using a comprehensive 
measure for unexpected accruals based on the cross-sectional Jones 1991 model. Then, 
they develop performance-matched measures to capture the unexpected component of six 
of the most significant accruals: accounts receivable, inventory, accounts payable, 
accrued liabilities, depreciation expense, and special items. The discretionary component 
of each of these accruals is estimated to determine whether a particular accrual is being 
used to manage earnings. They find that firms that issue equity appear to prefer managing 
earnings upward by accelerating revenue recognition. Specifically, they find that 
accounts receivable for these firms are unexpectedly high. Conversely, for the 
management buyout context, they find unexpected accounts receivable to be negative. 
For firms trying to avoid reporting an earnings decrease, they find that special items are 





and therefore are more likely to use more transitory and less costly items to achieve their 
goal. 
Regarding this approach’ usefulness, McNichols (2000) provides an excellent 
discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the specific accrual approach relative 
to the aggregate accruals approach. In terms of advantages, she states that  
The researcher can develop intuition for the key factors that influence the 
behavior of the accrual, exploiting his or her knowledge of generally accepted 
accounting principles. Second, a specific accrual approach can be applied in 
industries whose business practices cause the accrual in question to be a material 
and a likely object of judgment and discretion. A specific industry setting can also 
provide insight on variables to control to better identify the discretionary 
component of a given accrual. Third, one can estimate the relation between the 
single accrual and explanatory factors directly. If different components of 
aggregate accruals relate differently to change in sales, for example, aggregation 
can induce estimation error in parameter estimates. (p.333) 
 
In contrast, she argues that there are three potential disadvantages to using a 
specific accruals approach. These include: (1) Reducing its power if it is not clear which 
accrual method management might use to manipulate earnings, (2) The requirement of 
more institutional knowledge and data, which raises the cost of applying such 
approaches, and (3) Imposing limits to the generalizability of the findings, since studies 
of specific accruals tend to be confined to smaller or sector-specific examples. Moreover, 
McNichols and Wilson (1988) argue that one disadvantage of this approach is that if the 
nondiscretionary component of a given single account is large relative to the 








3) The Distributional Approach 
A third approach to detect earnings management is to examine the statistical 
properties of earnings to identify the behavior of earnings around a specified benchmark, 
such as zero or a prior quarter's earnings, to test whether the incidence of amounts above 
and below the benchmark are distributed smoothly, or reflect discontinuities due to the 
exercise of discretion. 
Studies by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser 
(1999) contribute an innovative approach to testing for earnings management by focusing 
on the density of the distribution of earnings after management. Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997) provide extensive systematic evidence about whether, how, and why firms avoid 
reporting earnings decreases and losses by employing the cross-sectional distribution 
approach. They find that the frequencies of small earnings decreases and small losses are 
abnormally low, while the frequencies of small earnings increases and small positive 
earnings are abnormally high, relative to adjacent regions of the distributions. They 
present two types of evidence to determine whether earnings management is used to 
avoid earnings decreases and losses. First, they present graphical evidence in the form of 
histograms of the pooled cross-sectional empirical distributions of scaled earnings 
changes and levels of earnings. Second, they construct a statistical test whose only 
assumption is that, under the null hypothesis of no earnings management, the cross-
sectional distributions of earnings changes and earnings levels are relatively smooth. This 
test statistic is the ratio of the difference between the actual and the expected number of 
observations over the estimated standard deviation of the difference. Their test results 





8.00 (5.88), where they employ intervals of widths of 0.0025 in their sample of 64,466 
firm-year observations for the period 1977–1994. 
Consistent with the above methodology, Degeorge et al. (1999) investigate the 
extent to which managers manipulate earnings in order to achieve specific levels of 
earnings. These levels are: 1) Reporting positive earnings, 2) Sustaining recent profit 
performance, and 3) Meeting analysts' expectations of earnings. Degeorge et al. (1999) 
find a strong evidence of earnings management driven by the three previous benchmarks. 
Furthermore, Myers, Myers, and Skinner (2007) test whether the frequency of 
consecutive quarterly earnings increases is greater than what would be expected by 
chance, finding that it is. In addition, Beatty, Ke, and Petroni (1999) examine differences 
in the incentives of private and public banks to manage earnings around zero and find 
that, relative to public banks, private banks report: 1) More small losses and fewer small 
profits, 2) More small declines and fewer small increases in earnings, and 3) Shorter 
strings of consecutive earnings increases. These findings conclude that public banks have 
greater incentives than private banks to manage earnings. Moreover, by examining the 
relation between discretionary loss reserve accruals and the distribution of reported 
earnings for a sample of property-casualty insurers, Beaver, McNicholes, and Nelson 
(2003) find that the loss reserve accrual is managed over the entire distribution of 
reported earnings, rather than exclusively or primarily in the region around zero. In 
addition, by dividing the sample into public, private, and mutual firms, they document 
that there is evidence that the least profitable firms understate loss reserves relative to the 
most profitable firms. Finally, they investigate the relation between financial condition 





into financially healthy and financially distressed insurers to find that loss reserve 
management to avoid losses is more pronounced in the sample of healthy insurers. 
Moreover, Holland and Ramsay (2003) is the first study to apply the distribution 
of reported earnings approach to the detection of earnings management using Australian 
data. They find evidence of discontinuities in the distribution of reported earnings and 
changes in earnings that are consistent with the hypotheses that listed Australian 
companies manage earnings to ensure reporting of positive profits and to sustain the 
previous year's profit performance. However, they state that their results are not as strong 
as those reported in the US and relate this difference, in part, to the lower power of their 
tests due to the smaller sample size and to the importance of earnings thresholds for 
different firm sizes and/or differences in the distribution of reported earnings and 
earnings changes between large and small firms. 
However, Durtschi and Easton (2005) provide evidence that the shapes 
(particularly around zero) of the frequency distributions of earnings metrics examined in 
the extant earnings management literature are affected by (1) Deflation (using, for 
example, price or market capitalization), (2) Sample selection criteria that lead to 
differential inclusion/exclusion of observations to the left of zero versus observations to 
the right of zero, (3) Differences between the characteristics of observations to the left of 
zero and observations to the right of zero (such as market pricing and analyst 
optimism/pessimism), or (4) A combination of these effects. Therefore, they conclude 
that these shapes cannot be used as ipso facto evidence of earnings management. In 





incentives, i.e., the conditions under which managers are more likely to manage earnings. 
In this regard, McNichols (2000) remarks that 
The distribution approach is also silent on the incentives for management to 
achieve specific benchmarks. How these incentives vary across firms, and what 
targets might be appropriate in different contexts are important questions for 
future research. A better understanding of why managers manipulate earnings will 
allow researchers to assess the power of alternative earnings management tests, 
and ultimately strengthen our understanding of the implications of earnings 
management for investors and other contracting parties. (p.337) 
 
On the other hand, McNichols (2000) argues that a prime advantage of the 
distribution approach is that it allows the researcher to make a strong prediction about the 
frequency of earnings realizations, which is unlikely to be due to the nondiscretionary 
component of earnings. 
Summary 
This chapter highlights many definitions of “Earnings Management” indicated in 
the accounting literature, which generally reveal that this term includes some level of 
deception, usually to influence some outcome. Next, it gives a critical overview of the 
characteristics associated with the most commonly applied designs in the earnings 
management literature. These research designs have followed several approaches with 
varying characteristics. They are classified under three broad approaches: the approach of 
aggregate accruals models, the approach of specific accruals models, and the 
distributional approach. The main advantage of reviewing such models is that it provides 
the researcher with a coherent and useful framework to measure the phenomenon of 
earnings management. It identifies that the research design employed by most of the 
earnings management literature relies primarily on accruals-based models to detect and 





In this regard, several studies have evaluated the ability of the alternative 
aggregate accruals models to detect earnings management. For example, Dechow et al. 
(1995) evaluate the relative performance of five alternative models by comparing the 
specification and power generated by these models, finding that the modified Jones 
model is the most powerful test of earnings management.10 In addition, Guay, Kothari, 
and Watts (1996) evaluate the same five discretionary accrual models documented in 
Dechow et al. (1995) and report that only the Jones and the modified Jones models 
appear to have the potential to provide reliable estimates of discretionary accruals. 
Moreover, Bartov et al. (2001) evaluate the ability of the cross-sectional Jones and 
modified Jones models vis-a-vis their time series counterparts and three other models 
used by prior studies (the Industry model, the DeAngelo Model, and the Healy Model) to 
detect earnings management. The results indicate that only the cross-sectional Jones and 
modified Jones models are consistently able to detect earnings management for a sample 
of firms receiving audit qualifications. They argue that using the cross-sectional model, 
rather than its time series counterpart, should result in a larger sample size that is less 
subject to a survivorship bias arising from requiring long time-series data. Additionally, 
unlike the time series model, the cross-sectional models don’t preclude samples of firms 
with short histories. Similarly, Peasnell et al. (2000a) have examined the performance of 
three alternative cross-sectional models for estimating the discretionary accruals portion. 
These alternative models are the Jones (1991) model, the modified Jones model, and a 
new cross-sectional model developed by the authors themselves, called “the margin 
model”. Following Dechow et al. (1995), the authors have evaluated the three models' 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
10 The models are Healy (1985), DeAngelo (1986), Jones (1991), Modified Jones model proposed 





performance in terms of specification (i.e., the probability of a Type I error) and power 
(i.e., the probability of a Type II error). The findings indicate that the Jones and modified 
Jones models appear to be significantly more powerful at detecting revenue and bad debt 
manipulations, while the margin model is better at detecting non-bad debt expense 
manipulations. Furthermore, Subramanyam (1996) argues that the cross-sectional version 
of the Jones model outperforms its time-series for the following reasons: “First, the cross-
sectional model generates a larger sample. Second, the number of observations per model 
is considerably higher for the cross-sectional model. This increases the precision of the 
estimates. Third, the time-series model is estimated over a period of up to ten years. 
Because of the lengthy time periods involved, it is possible for the model to be 
misspecified due to non- stationarity. Finally, use of the time-series model lowers the 
power of tests which examine time-series behavior in discretionary accruals, because of 
overlapping estimation and treatment periods” (p.254). Finally, of the 55 papers reviewed 
in the comprehensive study of McNichols (2000), 23 papers used an aggregate accruals 
approach based on the Jones model. The large number of studies that use this approach 
suggests that it is widely accepted as a proper proxy for earnings management. As a 
result, for the purpose of this particular study, the researcher uses different cross-sectional 






THE EFFECT OF INTERNAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ON 
CONSTRAINING EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
Introduction 
"The governance of the corporation is now as important to the world economy as the 
government of countries".  
James D. Wolfensohn 
President, World Bank Group. 
The separation of ownership and control in the modern corporate structure has 
increased the importance of corporate governance to protect the interests of firms’ 
stakeholders including investors, creditors, employees, customers, and suppliers. 
Corporate governance intends to manage and minimize the potential conflicts of interests 
among corporate participants (Rezaee, 2007). The conflicts of interests are due to agency 
problem, where the managers or the agent may not act in the interests of the corporation's 
owners (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Recently, the 
corporate governance concept expanded to include not only the conflicts of interests 
between the managers and providers of finance but also to include the conflicts among 
managers and all firm’s stakeholders (Goergen, 2012).  
Corporate governance has significant implications for the financial stability and 
performance of companies and thereby the economic growth of a country (Rezaee, 2009). 
In this regard, International Finance Corporation (IFC) in 2014 states  
Good corporate governance helps companies operate more efficiently, improve 
access to capital, mitigate risk and safeguard against mismanagement. It makes 
companies more accountable and transparent to investors and gives them the tools 
to respond to stakeholder concerns. Corporate governance also contributes to 
development. Increased access to capital encourages new investments, boosts 






The previous explanation predicts a negative relationship between corporate 
governance and earnings management.1 The remainder of this chapter is organized as 
follows. Section 2 presents a summary of the definitions of corporate governance. Section 
3 reviews the theoretical background of the audit committee and its role in constraining 
the earnings management. Section 4 examines the importance of board composition on 
mitigating the earnings management. Section 5 highlights the monitoring role of 
subordinate managers. Finally, section 6 concludes the chapter.  
Definitions of Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance defined in different ways and from different perspectives. 
Berghe and De Ridder (1999) classify corporate governance definitions into three main 
perspectives. The first group defines corporate governance from governance policy and 
supervision perspective, the second group focuses on the perspective of the relationships 
among parties involved and how to balance their interests, and the third group focuses on 
the perspective of enterprise’s mission and its outcomes.2  
The most widely used definition of corporate governance is the one proposed by 
Cadbury Committee (1992). They define corporate governance as "The system by which 
companies are directed and controlled". Gillan and Starks, (1998) state that corporate 
governance can be simply defined as the system of laws, rules, and factors that control 
operations at a company. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest that corporate governance 
entails an inherent link to the economic interests of the participants and define it as "the 
ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return 
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NASDAQ that earnings management and poor corporate governance mechanisms are positively related.  





on their investment" (p.737). Further, Prowse (1998) argues that corporate governance is 
"the rules, standards and organizations in an economy that govern the behavior of 
corporate owners, directors and managers and define their duties and accountability to 
outside investors, i.e., shareholders and lenders" (p.2). In addition, Donaldson (1990) 
defines corporate governance as "the structure whereby managers at the organizational 
apex are controlled through the board of directors, its associated structures, executive 
incentive and other schemes of monitoring and bonding" (p.376). Armstrong, Guay, and 
Weber (2010) view corporate governance as the subset of a firm’s contracts that help 
align the actions and choices of managers with the interests of shareholders. Corporate 
governance includes but not limited to the system of laws, regulations, institutions, 
markets, contracts, and corporate policies and procedures (such as the internal control 
system, policy manuals, and budgets) that direct and influence the actions of the top-level 
decision makers in the corporation (shareholders, boards, and executives) (Brickley & 
Zimmerman, 2010). More generally, Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna (2007) define it as 
"the set of mechanisms that influence the decisions made by managers when there is 
separation of ownership and control" (p.964). 
Demb and Neubauer (1992) state that corporate governance is "the process by 
which corporations are made responsive to the rights and wishes of stakeholders" (p.187). 
Furthermore, Turnbull (1997) describes it as "the influences affecting the institutional 
processes, including those for appointing the controllers and/or regulators, involved in 
organizing the production and sale of goods and services". Similarly, Solomon (2007) 
define corporate governance as "the system of checks and balances, both internal and 





their stakeholders and act in a socially responsible way in all areas of their business 
activity" (p.14). Moreover, Monks and Minow (1995) view corporate governance as "the 
relationship among various participants in determining the direction and performance of 
corporations" (p.1). Also, John and Senbet (1998) propose that "corporate governance 
deals with mechanisms by which stakeholders of a corporation exercise control over 
corporate insiders and management such that their interests are protected" (p.372).  
According to IFC in 2014 "Corporate governance is defined as the structures and 
processes by which companies are directed and controlled.” With almost the same 
perspective in describing the corporate governance, the European Central Bank (2004) 
states that corporate governance is the "Procedures and processes according to which an 
organization is directed and controlled. The corporate governance structure specifies the 
distribution of rights and responsibilities among the different participants in the 
organization – such as the board, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders – and 
lays down the rules and procedures for decision-making". Furthermore, Cadbury (2000) 
states that "corporate governance is concerned with holding the balance between 
economic and social goals and between individual and communal goals. The governance 
framework is there to encourage the efficient use of resources and equally to require 
accountability for the stewardship of those resources. The aim is to align as nearly as 
possible the interests of individuals, corporations and of society" (p.vi). Similarly, the 
Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) (2003) defines corporate governance as "the system by 
which companies are directed and managed. It influences how the objectives of the 
company are set and achieved, how risk is monitored and assessed, and how performance 





(through entrepreneurism, innovation, development and exploration) and provide 
accountability and control systems commensurate with the risks involved". Finally, 
according to the OECD principles (2004), corporate governance is defined as “one key 
element in improving economic efficiency and growth as well as enhancing investor 
confidence. Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a company’s 
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance 
also provides the structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the 
means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are determined” (p.11). 
Regardless of the used definition, researchers often view corporate governance 
mechanisms as falling into one of two groups: internal or external governance (Gillan, 
2006). Gillan (2006) explains the sources of the two governance types by the balance 
sheet model of the firm as depicted in Figure 4. The left-hand side represents the internal 
governance including two sources. First, management that acts as shareholders’ agents, 
decides in which assets to invest and how to finance those investments. Second, board of 
directors that is in charge of advising and monitoring management and has the 
responsibility to hire, fire, and compensate senior management team (Jensen, 1993). The 
right-hand side displays the elements of external governance that arise because of firm’s 






Figure 4. Corporate governance and the balance sheet model of the firm. Source: Gillan, 
S. L. (2006, p. 382). 
 
Gillan (2006) proposes a more comprehensive perspective of corporate governance of the 
firm to include other participants such as employees, suppliers, and customers, as 
depicted in Figure 5.  
 
 
Figure 5. Corporate governance: beyond the balance sheet model. Source: Gillan, S. L. 





Further, Gillan (2006) expands the basic framework, as depicted in Figure 6, to 
examine a broader set of governance influences. Gillan (2006) divides the internal 
governance into 5 basic categories: 1) The Board of Directors (and their role, structure, 
and incentives), 2) Managerial Incentives, 3) Capital Structure, 4) Bylaw and Charter 
Provisions (or antitakeover measures), and 5) Internal Control Systems, and divides the 
external governance into 5 groups: 1) Law and Regulation, specifically federal law, self-
regulatory organizations, and state law, 2) Markets 1 (including capital markets, the 
market for corporate control, labor markets, and product markets), 3) Markets 2, 
emphasizing providers of capital market information (such as that provided by credit, 
equity, and governance analysts), 4) Markets 3, focusing on accounting, financial and 
legal services from parties external to the firm (including auditing, directors’ and 
officers’ liability insurance, and investment banking advice), and 5) Private Sources of 
External Oversight, particularly the media and external lawsuits. 
 
 







Theoretical Background of Audit Committee 
To overcome the agency problem, the boards have been given an oversight role 
that typically includes monitoring the CEO and other top executives, approving the 
company's strategy, and monitoring the control system. Boards of directors generally 
perform their oversight function through committees in order to make efficient use of 
time and to take advantage of the expertise of individual directors. These committees are 
a subset of the board, as such, they performs specific functions and make 
recommendations for final approval by the entire boards of directors that assist the board 
in discharging its advisory and oversight responsibilities.  
National stock exchanges require that listed companies to form at least three 
board committees: audit, compensation, and nominating committees. Moreover, public 
companies often have governance committee and other committees to deal with issues 
that require specific expertise such as finance, IT, and disclosure. Concerning the three 
mandatory committees, Rezaee (2007) demonstrate their functions as follows: 
Compensation committee serves to design, review, and implement directors and 
executives’ compensation plans, nominating committee monitors issues pertaining to the 
recommendations, nominations, and elections activities of directors, and audit committee 
to take the lead on oversight responsibilities in the areas of internal controls, financial 
reporting, audit activities and compliance with applicable laws and regulations. 
Related to audit committee, it can play an important role in preventing and 
detecting fraudulent financial reporting (National Commission on Fraudulent Financial 





governance in firms (Chen, Duh, & Shiue, 2008). Chambers (2005) states that audit 
committees have four main duties  
            (1) After scrutiny, to advise the board on the reliability of financial and perhaps 
other information to be published in the name of the board. (2) After 
investigation, to advise the board on the effectiveness of risk management and 
internal control throughout the business. (3) To oversee the arrangements for the 
independent audit of the financial statements of the company. (4) To assess the 
adequacy and effectiveness of internal audit provision, and that of other review 
services (such as the compliance, quality assurance and risk management 
functions. (p.96)  
 
Moreover, Mohiuddin and Karbhari (2010) state that  
 
            While the primary responsibilities of the audit committee are to assist the board 
with its duties in overseeing the corporation’s reporting and audit requirements 
(Chen et al., 2008), it also (1) monitors the integrity of the company’s financial 
statements and reporting system, (2) ensures that the company complies with legal 
and regulatory requirements, (3) monitors independent auditors’ qualifications 
and independence, (4) monitors the performance of the company’s internal and 
external auditors, and (5) monitors compliance with corporate legality and ethical 
standards, including the maintenance of preventive fraud controls (Marsh and 
Powell (1989) and Baruch(1980)). (p.105)  
Over the years, various initiatives to strengthen and increase the responsibilities of 
audit committees to protect investors have been made. In the investigation of McKesson 
& Robbins, Inc. fraud in the 1930s, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
endorsed the concept of the audit committee and recommended in 1940 that publicly held 
companies create audit committees to improve the integrity of corporate financial 
information. However, it was not until the late 1960s and 1970s that audit committee 
oversight in the United States received widespread attention (DeZoort, 1997). Since that 
time, audit committees characteristics of their membership, their responsibilities, and 
their effectiveness are of great interest to the accounting community, both academic 
researchers and practitioners. In 1967, the American Institute of Certified Public 





committees composed entirely of outside directors. In 1972, the SEC encouraged the 
establishment of audit committees composed of independent directors, and by 1974; the 
SEC began to require public disclosure of whether audit committee members were, in 
fact, independent. The stock exchanges quickly followed by either requiring or 
recommending that companies establish audit committees. In 1976, Congress debated a 
law that would have required public companies to form audit committees composed of 
independent directors. Despite failing to pass this bill, Congress encouraged the voluntary 
formation of these committees by enacting the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). In 
1978, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) required all listed firms to have an audit 
committee. In 1987, the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
(Treadway Commission) highlights important aspects of the audit committee's oversight 
function and offers six specific audit committee recommendations aimed at deterring 
fraudulent financial reporting. In 1989, the National Association of Securities Dealers 
(NASD) began requiring all companies listed on NASDAQ to establish an audit 
committee. 
In September 1998, the former chairman of the SEC, Arthur Levitt, with his 
speech "The Numbers Game", called for audit committees to do a better job of protecting 
the integrity of financial reporting and the interests of shareholders. Levitt described an 
ideal audit committee as one "that meets twelve times a year before each board meeting, 
where every member has a financial background, where there are no personal ties to the 
chairman or the company, where they have their own advisors, where they ask tough 
questions of management and outside auditors and where, ultimately, the investor interest 





Corporate Audit Committees (BRC) made 10 recommendations for improving audit 
committees’ effectiveness.3 BRC also provided five guiding principles for audit 
committee best practices to serve as building for devising company-specific processes 
and practices. The BRC recommendations resulted in changes by NASDAQ, NYSE, 
AMEX, and the SEC. The SEC approved NYSE and NASDAQ rules regarding audit 
committees in December 1999. Under these rules, listed companies were required to 
disclose whether their board had adopted a written audit committee charter and whether 
the committee members were "independent" as defined in the applicable listing standards. 
As of January 30, 2000, the SEC began requiring public companies to file audit 
committee reports. 
In 2000, the National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) formed a Blue 
Ribbon Commission on Audit Committees to develop guidance on best practices for audit 
committees. The NACD commission report pointed out that the oversight role of an audit 
committee is broadening in a way that covers three distinct areas: financial reporting, 
audit functions, and risk management and control. To fulfill this expanding role, the 
report recommended that all audit committees should be able to rely on its members' 
financial and business expertise, independence, and diligence. In addition, audit 
committees should be given sufficient resources, including the availability of a full scope 
internal audit department, to provide the information needed to perform their governance 
mandate. Moreover, the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission (COSO) conducted a study of selected US public company financial frauds, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
3 The first two recommendations are aimed at strengthening the independence of the audit 
committee, the second set of recommendations (from 3-5) is aimed at making the audit committee more 
effective, and the final group of recommendations (from 6-10) addresses mechanisms for accountability 





with a special attention to the board of directors and audit committee practices in 
companies where fraud had occurred. The COSO fraud study analyzed 200 financial 
fraud cases identified in the SEC filings throughout the period 1987-1997. The key 
findings of this study indicated that individuals serving on audit committees of these 
fraud companies typically lacked financial expertise and were not supported by an 
internal audit function. The study also found that many of these audit committees met 
only once each year. In many ways, these committees were set up to fail, and the COSO 
study called for much greater focus on audit committee expertise and diligence. In 2002, 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act increased audit committees’ responsibilities and authority, and 
raised membership requirements and committee composition to include more 
independent directors. In response, the SEC and the stock exchanges proposed new 
regulations and rules to strengthen audit committees. 
In Canada, the Ontario Business Corporation Act (1979) mandates that a 
corporation is legally required to submit its financial statements to its audit committee 
before such statements are submitted to the board of directors. Similarly, the Committee 
on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Cadbury Committee) in the United 
Kingdom (1992) has issued a report that includes a Code of Best Practice. The 
Committee recommended that the boards of all listed companies registered in the United 
Kingdom establish and maintain audit committees.  
To conclude, the interest in the quality of audit committees attempting to improve 
its effectiveness in performing its oversight operations has increased dramatically in 
recent years. Many studies include the effect of different attributes of audit committee on 





quality of the financial reporting. These attributes include independence, competency, 
and activity. 
Audit Committee Independence 
Section 30 of SOX requires that all listed company audit committee members be 
independent which mean they could not be affiliated with the company or any 
subsidiaries and did not directly or indirectly receive any consulting, advisory, or other 
compensatory fee from the company other than in their capacity as members of the board. 
The new SOX audit committee independence rules became effective at companies' first 
annual shareholders meetings after January 15, 2004.  
As noted in Figure 7, SOX enhanced independence requirements to impose for 
the first time that all listed company audit committee members be independent, compared 
to the attempts of the SEC and U.S stock exchanges beginning in the late 1990s. For 
example, in 1998, only about half of all public companies had fully independent audit 
committees.   
 
Figure 7. Evolving audit committee independence – S&P 1500 companies. Source: Ernst 
& Young (2012, p. 4).  
 
Prior to December 1999, the NYSE required each firm to have an audit committee 





interfere the exercise of independent judgment as a committee member. While the 
NASDAQ required only independent directors comprise a majority of a firm's audit 
committee. Their definition of an independent director was a "person other than an 
officer or employee of the company or its subsidiaries or any other individual having a 
relationship which, in the opinion of the board of directors, would interfere with the 
exercise of independent judgment in carrying out the responsibilities of a director". 
AMEX strongly recommended but did not require firms to have independent audit 
committees. In December 1999, the NYSE and NASDAQ modified their requirements by 
mandating that all large listed U.S. companies should maintain audit committees with at 
least three directors, "all of whom have no relationship to the company that may interfere 
with the exercise of their independence from management and the company". These new 
requirements are in response to the SEC’s call for improving the effectiveness of 
corporate audit committees in overseeing the financial reporting process. By December 
2003, all stock markets started requiring each listed firm to have an audit committee with 
all independent directors. 
Prior accounting research has examined the relationship between audit committee 
independence and different financial reporting issues including financial reporting 
misstatements, fraud, and earnings management. For example, McMullen and 
Raghunandan (1996) find that financial reporting problems are less likely when audit 
committees consist solely of outsiders who are not employees of the company.4 In 
addition, Abbott et al. (2000) document that companies with audit committees composed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
4 Their survey (was done of 51 companies with financial reporting problems and 77 companies 
with no such problems) showed that just 67% of the audit committees of problem companies had only 





of independent directors were less likely to be sanctioned by the SEC for fraudulent or 
misleading financial reporting. Similarly, Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, and Lapides 
(2000) provide evidence that companies found to be fraudulent in their presentation of 
financial information in three industries (technology, health care, and financial services) 
had less independent audit committees than a control sample of companies that were not 
found to be fraudulent. Furthermore, Uzun, Szewczyk, and Varma (2004) find that the 
number of independent directors on board and its audit committee is negatively related to 
corporate fraud using 133 matched pairs of companies.  
Regarding the earnings management practices, Xie et al. (2003), using a small 
sample of 282 firm-year observations, report that earnings management is significantly 
negatively related to the percentage of outside directors on board and audit committee. In 
addition, Ebrahim (2007) finds that earnings management is negatively related to audit 
committee independence using a sample of manufacturing firms in the years 1999 and 
2000. Furthermore, Choi, Jeon, and Park (2004) used 116 observations obtained from the 
Korean Stock Exchange during the period 2000-2001 and find a positive relationship 
between the ownership of shares by audit committee members, used as a measure of the 
independence of an audit committee, and the degree of earnings management. Moreover, 
Bedard et al. (2004) use a sample of companies with extreme measures of earnings 
management and find significant negative relation between measures of earnings 
management and the all-independent audit committees. In addition, Klein (2002) used a 
sample of 692 large publicly traded S&P 500 companies and finds that firms with boards 
and/or audit committees composed of less than a majority of independent directors are 





adjusted discretionary accruals. However, Klein (2002) did not find an evidence of a 
systematic relation between an all-independent audit committee and discretionary 
accruals. Consistent with the results of Klein (2002), Davidson et al. (2005), using a 
broad cross-sectional sample of 434 listed Australian companies for the year 2000, find a 
negative association between the discretionary accruals and audit committees comprising 
of a majority of non-executive directors. However, no association has been found 
between the discretionary accruals and committees comprised solely of non-executives. 
Finally, using Malaysian data, Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006) find an insignificant 
relationship between the audit committee independence and earnings management. 
Audit Committee Competency  
Section 401 of SOX requires the audit committee to include at least one member 
who is considered a financial expert. However, the other members of the audit committee 
should be financially literate. Such ‘literacy’ signifies the ability to read and understand 
fundamental financial statements, including a company’s balance sheet, income 
statement, and cash flow statement (BRC, 1999, p.26). The BRC (1999) define financial 
expertise as "past employment experience in finance or accounting, requisite professional 
certification in accounting, or any other comparable experience or background which 
results in the individual's financial sophistication, including being or having been a CEO 
or other senior officer with financial oversight responsibilities" (p.25). 
The final SEC rules (2003) define an "audit committee financial expert" as a 
person who has the following attributes: (1) An understanding of generally accepted 
accounting principles and financial statements, (2) The ability to assess the general 





and reserves, (3) Experience preparing, auditing, analyzing or evaluating financial 
statements that present a breadth and level of complexity of accounting issues that are 
generally comparable to the breadth and complexity of issues that can reasonably be 
expected to be raised by the registrant's financial statements, or experience actively 
supervising one or more persons engaged in such activities, (4) An understanding of 
internal controls and procedures for financial reporting and (5) An understanding of audit 
committee functions.  
In addition, section 407 of SOX requires each company to disclose whether or 
not, and if not, the reasons therefor, the audit committee of that issuer is comprised of at 
least 1 member who is a financial expert, as such term is defined by the Commission. 
According to Ernst and Young (2012), almost one-half of all audit committee members 
meet the definition of a financial expert.  
Several studies highlight the importance of audit committee member expertise as 
a necessary attribute for improving the oversight role of the audit committee. McMullen 
and Raghunandan (1996), for example, find that companies subject to SEC enforcement 
actions or restating their quarterly reports were less likely to have CPAs on their audit 
committee.5 Similarly, Xie et al. (2003) find that the proportion of audit committee 
members with corporate or investment banking backgrounds is negatively associated with 
the level of earnings management as they are expected to have the experience and 
training to understand earnings management. In addition, Bedard et al. (2004) provide 
evidence that the financial sophistication of the board and the audit committee is an 
important factor in constraining the propensity of managers to engage in earnings 
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management. Furthermore, Choi et al. (2004) measure the competency of an audit 
committee by the expertise of its committee members, specifically classified under five 
categories: accounting-related, finance-related, professors, other firm-related expertise, 
and law-related expertise, using Korean companies, and find the presence of professors or 
members of financial institutions on the committee is negatively related to earnings 
management. Moreover, Agrawal and Chadha (2005) find that the probability of restating 
financial statements is significantly lower when the audit committee has an independent 
financial expert. In addition, Zhang, Zhou, and Zhou (2007) provide evidence that firms 
are more likely to be identified with an internal control weakness under SOX if their 
audit committees have less accounting financial expertise. 
With respect to the financial expertise requirement on audit committee behavior, 
DeZoort (1998) examines whether experience affects audit committee members' 
oversight judgments. A sample of 87 audit committee members completed an internal 
control oversight task and their judgments were compared to those of a criterion group of 
external auditors. The findings, in general, indicate that audit committee members with 
experience made internal control judgments more like auditors than did members without 
experience. The findings also indicate that experienced audit committee members made 
more consistent judgments, had higher consensus and higher technical content levels for 
additional items offered than did the members without experience. Also, DeZoort and 
Salterio (2001) find that audit committee members with corporate governance experience 
and financial reporting and auditing knowledge are more likely to understand auditor 
judgments and to support the auditor in auditor-management disputes, and more likely to 





In order to investigate the extent to which financial experts differ from financial 
literates in making judgments about financial reporting quality, McDaniel, Martin, and 
Maines (2002) conduct an experimental study using 2 groups: financial experts (audit 
managers) and financial literates (recent Executive M.B.A. graduates) by examining the 
relations between assessments of overall reporting quality and assessments of three 
quality characteristics (relevance, reliability, and comparability) taken from the 
qualitative characteristics of accounting information (SFAC No.2). Their results indicate 
that experts' individual assessments of the relevance and comparability characteristics of 
quality better aggregate to their overall assessments of reporting quality, while literates' 
evaluations of overall reporting quality do not reflect these characteristics consistently. 
Neither group's overall reporting-quality assessments reflected the reliability assessment. 
In addition, the results indicate that literates were more likely than experts to focus on 
reporting treatments that have received prominent coverage in the business press and are 
nonrecurring/ distinctive in nature or have less important implications for reporting 
quality. In contrast, experts were more likely than literates to identify reporting concerns 
related to recurring business activities, i.e., activities which their experiences would 
suggest are associated with quality concerns. 
Audit Committee Activity 
There are various functions that should be performed by an effective audit 
committee. SOX (2002) has specifically identified certain audit committee functions 
which include reviewing financial statements and related disclosures, discussing various 
financial reporting items with management and the external auditor, reviewing reports of 





internal and external audit activities, and meeting privately with the internal and external 
auditors. Menon and Williams (1994) argue that, for the audit committee to be effective, 
it is not enough to be independent but it must also be active and vigilant. 
The BRC (1999) recommends that audit committees should meet at least four 
times annually, or more frequently as circumstances dictate to discuss financial reporting 
quality with the external auditor and to provide up-to-date charters detailing committee 
responsibilities. Likewise, the NACD (2000) suggests that audit committees should hold 
four half-day meetings each year. 
Consistent with BRC (1999) and NACD (2000), several studies have used the 
number of meetings as a proxy to investigate whether there is any association between 
the activity of an audit committee and the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting. 
The results, in general, indicate that greater meeting frequency is likely to be associated 
with fewer incidences of financial reporting problems. For example, Menon and Williams 
(1994) find that those audit committees that do not meet or meet less frequently are less 
likely to perform their monitoring function properly. In addition, McMullen and 
Raghunandan (1996) show that the audit committees of companies subject to SEC 
enforcement actions or restating their quarterly reports were less likely to have frequent 
meetings than those companies without such reporting problems.6 Likewise, Abbott et al. 
(2000) suggest that companies with audit committees that met at least twice per year were 
less likely to be sanctioned by the SEC for fraudulent financial reporting. Similarly, 
Beasley et al. (2000) find evidence that fraud companies in the technology and health-
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care industries had fewer audit committee meetings (generally one time per year) than did 
no-fraud industry benchmarks (generally two or three time per year, which is still below 
the best practices suggested by BRC, 1999 and NACD, 2000). Furthermore, Xie et al. 
(2003) find that the number of audit committee meetings is negatively associated with 
discretionary current accruals, suggesting that a more active audit committee that meets 
more often should be in a better position to monitor issues such as earnings management.  
Moreover, using a sample of 108 non-financial Spanish companies that traded on 
the Madrid Stock Exchange between 2003 and 2006 (432 observations), Garcia, 
Barbadillo, and Pere (2012) find that the size and number of meetings of the audit 
committee had a significant negative association with earnings manipulations. However, 
Uzun et al. (2004) did not find any significant relation between financial reporting fraud 
and the meeting frequency of board and audit committee. Also, Bedard et al. (2004) find 
that there is no relationship between the number of audit committee meetings and the 
level of earnings management. Similarly, Lin, Li, and Yang (2006) suggest no significant 
impact of the frequency of audit committees meetings on the earnings management. 
Furthermore, for a sample of Australian listed companies, Baxter and Cotter (2009) 
results indicate that a greater number of audit committee meetings do not seem to reduce 
either earnings management or to enhance earnings quality measures. Finally, based on 
116 observations obtained from the Korean stock exchange during the period 2000-2001, 
Choi et al. (2004) find that the number of meetings per fiscal year is not significantly 
related to earnings management in Korea. 
In a comprehensive study, Chtourou, Bedard, and Courteau (2001) examine the 





managements measured by the magnitude of positive and negative discretionary accruals. 
Using two groups of 300 U.S companies, one with relatively high and one with relatively 
low levels of discretionary accruals in the year of 1996, they find that earnings 
management is negatively associated with the following audit committee characteristics: 
the percentage of independent non-executive directors who are not managers in other 
firms, the presence of at least one member with financial expertise, the presence of a 
clear mandate for the oversight and monitoring of both financial statements and external 
audit, and the presence of a completely independent audit committee that holds more than 
two meetings in the year.  
The Role of the Board of Directors 
The board of directors is the most important control mechanism available in the 
corporate governance because it forms the apex of a firm's internal governance structure 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983). Rezaee (2007) states that the primary responsibilities of the 
boards of directors are to: 1) Hire a competent and ethical CEO, 2) Ensure other top 
executives are being hired, and 3) Monitor management's sustainable strategic, financial 
and operational goals in achieving long-term shareholder value.  In 2004, NACD report 
summaries 11 roles of boards as follows: 1) Approving the company's philosophy, vision 
and mission, 2) Appointing, monitoring, evaluating, compensating, and, when warranted, 
replacing the company's CEO and other senior executives, and ensuring the management 
succession, 3) Reviewing and approving management's strategic plans, decisions and 
actions, 4) Reviewing and approving the company's financial objectives, plans, decisions 
and actions, including significant capital allocations and expenditures, 5) Reviewing and 





acquisitions, special purpose entities), 6) Monitoring corporate sustainable and enduring 
performance, 7) Ensuring the company's compliance with all applicable laws, regulations, 
rules and standards, including ethical auditing and accounting standards, 8) Evaluating 
the board's oversight effectiveness, the performance of each of the board committees, and 
individual directors, 9) Forming board committees (e.g., audit, compensation, 
governance, nominating) to promote effective accountability for each committee and its 
members, 10) Communicating with shareholders by attending the annual meetings and 
responding to shareholders' questions and concerns, and 11) Performing such other 
functions as required by law or assigned to the board in the company's governance 
documents.  
Consequently, the board of directors is considered the most essential component 
of corporate governance in providing advisory and oversight functions. It plays a key role 
in the overall overseeing of the company and the monitoring of top management in 
particular (Jensen & Mekling, 1976). Thus, the quality of these functions is a very 
important determinant of corporate governance effectiveness. In an attempt to improve 
the board's effectiveness, a number of recent empirical studies of corporate governance 
suggest that some attributes of the board of directors should be achieved and these 
attributes are expected to have an influence on the quality of financial reporting. These 
board attributes include board independence and other board related characteristics. 
Board Independence 
Several definitions of independent board of directors are provided in the literature 
and by authoritative sources. The most comprehensive definition has been adapted by the 





nontrivial professional, financial, or non-financial connection to the corporation, its 
chairman, CEO, or any other executive is his or her directorship.  
Fama (1980) argues that the inclusion of outside directors as professional referees 
improves the likelihood the board will achieve its control function and lowers the 
probability of top management colluding with other board members against the 
shareholders’ interests. The Committee for Economic Development (CED) in 2006 states 
"We acknowledge at the outset that no laws or policies will ever be sufficient to end all 
corporate misbehavior. We are confident that truly independent and inquisitive boards of 
directors will provide the best safeguard against corporate wrongdoing". In this regard, 
Rezaee (2007) states that the independence of the company's board of directors is a 
critical aspect of corporate governance and has a significant impact on the board's 
effectiveness. To interpret the effective monitoring role of the independent directors, 
Fama and Jensen (1983) posit that the superior monitoring ability of non-executives can 
be attributed to the incentive to maintain their reputations in the external labor market. 
Moreover, Ebrahim (2007) documents that the value of the board of directors’ human 
capital as outside directors may diminish if they do not adequately monitor managers. 
Therefore, outside directors are widely believed to protect the interests of shareholders 
more effectively. 
A growing number of recent empirical studies have examined the association of 
board independence with fraud and earnings management. Regarding the fraudulent 
financial reporting, Dechow et al. (1996) argue that firms with a large percentage of non-
executive directors are less likely to be subject to SEC enforcement actions for violating 





percentage of non-executive members on the board of directors and the likelihood of 
financial statement fraud.  
Concerning the earnings management practices, the results of these studies are 
inconclusive. Peasnell et al. (2000b) examine the impact of the Cadbury Committee 
report (1992) on the association between earnings management and board composition 
using a sample of UK firms. They find no evidence of an association between the degree 
of earnings management and the board composition during the pre-Cadbury period but 
they document a significant negative relationship between income-increasing accruals 
and the proportion of non-executive directors in the post-Cadbury period. These results 
comply with Cadbury Committee report, which focused attention on the contribution that 
independent directors can make to the board’s monitoring duties. Furthermore, Klein 
(2002) and Xie et al. (2003) find empirical evidence of the negative relation between the 
earnings management and the percent of outside directors on the board. In Australia, 
Davidson et al. (2005) find a significant negative relationship between earnings 
management and the presence of a board comprised of a majority of non-executive 
directors using a sample of 434 listed Australian firms for the financial year ending in 
2000. Similarly, Ebrahim, (2007) finds a negative relation between earnings management 
and both board and audit committee independence to be mediated by their activity using a 
sample of manufacturing firms in the years 1999 and 2000. Moreover, Peasnell, Pope, 
and Young (2005), using a sample of UK firms, find that firms with a higher proportion 
of outside directors on the board are associated with less income-increasing earnings 
management when pre-managed earnings fall below either zero or last year's reported 





income decreasing earnings management when pre-managed earnings are very high. 
Generally, Niu (2006) demonstrates that overall governance quality (including board 
composition, management shareholding, shareholders’ rights and the extent of disclosure 
of governance practices) is negatively related to the level of abnormal accruals. 
In contrast, in Canada, Park and Shin (2004) find that the impact of outside 
directors and directors from financial institutions on the earnings management is not 
significantly different between periods before and after the issuance of the Toronto Stock 
Exchange's Corporate Governance Guidelines of 1994. Therefore, there is no evidence 
that outside directors and directors from financial institutions will become more effective 
in constraining income-increasing accrual manipulation. In addition, Chtourou et al. 
(2001) consider three characteristics of board independence: the inclusion of independent 
directors on the board, the separation of the roles of chair and Chief Executive Officer, 
and the presence of an independent nomination committee and find no association 
between a higher percentage of non-executives independent directors on the board, the 
combination of the roles of chair and CEO, and a majority of non- executives directors on 
the nominating committee and on the other hand the level of earnings management. 
Using Malaysian data, Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006) find an insignificant relationship 
between board independence and earnings management. In this regard, Johari, Saleh, 
Jaffar, and Hassan (2008) indicate that the minimum composition of one-third 
independent director, as suggested by the Code of Corporate Governance in Malaysia, is 







Other Board Attributes  
The corporate governance literature shows different characteristics that may 
influence the effectiveness with which the boards monitor the performance of managers 
in firms.  According to the recommendations of the Cadbury Committee (1992) and the 
BRC (1999), it is expected that the competence of non-executive board members is of 
special importance for the monitoring effectiveness of the board of directors. In this 
regard, Xie et al. (2003) find that the board-monitoring role may improve when board 
members are financially sophisticated (e.g., experienced in other corporations or in 
investment banking). Xie et al. (2003) state  
A director with a corporate or financial background may be more familiar with 
the ways that earnings can be managed and may better understand the 
implications of earnings manipulation. In contrast, a director with no corporate or 
financial background may be a well-intentioned monitor but may not have the 
training or financial sophistication to fully understand earnings management. 
(p.298)  
 
Moreover, Chtourou et al. (2001) find that board competency, measured by the 
average non-executive directors' tenure and the average number of directorships a board 
member holds, is negatively associated with the level of earnings management. 
Furthermore, Park and Shin (2004) find evidence that the presence of officers of financial 
intermediaries, who are likely to have a greater ability to detect earnings management, on 
the board reduces earnings management. In addition, they find evidence that the presence 
of representatives from large pension funds on the board further reduce the practice of 
earnings management, since this practice may negatively affect the long-run performance 
of pension funds. 
Beside competency, a number of empirical studies have examined the effect of 





the results of these studies provide no consensus about the direction of this relation. 
Beasley (1996) finds a positive relationship between board size and the likelihood of 
financial statement fraud. Similarly, Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006) argue that earnings 
management is positively related to the size of the board of directors. In contrast, 
Chtourou et al. (2001) document that board size is negatively associated with earnings 
management. Furthermore, Ching, Firth, and Rui (2006) find a negative relation between 
board size and earnings management using a sample of 313 firms from Hong Kong. In 
this regard, Xie et al. (2003) argue that "In the case of earnings management, a larger 
board may be more likely to have independent directors with corporate or financial 
experience. If so, a larger board might be better at preventing earnings management" 
(p.300). However, Abbott et al. (2000) fail to find any association between the board size 
and the level of earnings management.  
Regarding the board meetings frequency, the results are not equally consistent. 
For example, Lipton and Lorsch (1992) argue that boards that meet frequently are more 
likely to perform their duties diligently. Xie et al. (2003) show that more active boards 
are associated with a lower level of earnings management. Xie et al. (2003) argue that "A 
board that meets more often should be able to devote more time to issues such as earnings 
management. A board that seldom meets may not focus on these issues and may perhaps 
only rubber-stamp management plans" (p.300). However, Jensen (1993) pointed out that 
board meetings are not necessary useful because, given their limited time, they cannot be 
used for meaningful exchange of ideas among directors or with managers.7 In addition, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  





Uzun et al. (2004) did not find any significant relation between financial reporting fraud 
and the meeting frequency of the board. 
Internal Monitoring By Subordinate Managers 
Attempts have been made overtime to improve the oversight role by setting up 
good governance structures. Prior accounting research pays considerable attention to 
studying the board of directors and the audit committee. For instance, the Public 
Oversight Board (POB) (1993) limits the corporate governance definition as follows 
"those oversight activities undertaken by the board of directors and audit committee to 
ensure the integrity of the financial reporting process". However, previous literature on 
corporate governance suggests that traditional governance mechanisms have limited 
impact on reducing the agency cost. For example, current discussion of corporate 
governance ignores important players in the corporate governance arena who play a key 
role in fraud detection (Dyck, Morse, & Zingales, 2010).8 Moreover, Peasnell et al. 
(2005), using UK data, find no evidence that the presence of an audit committee has any 
impact on the extent of income-increasing manipulations to meet or exceed two earnings 
benchmarks: avoiding reporting a loss and sustaining recent profit performance. 
Similarly, they find an insignificant relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms (including independence of board and audit committee) and earnings 
management, explaining that the board of directors is seen as ineffective in discharging 
their monitoring duties due to management dominance over board matters and the board 
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of directors’ relative lack of knowledge in company’s affairs. In addition, Burns et al.  
(2010) argue that institutional investors with short investment horizons have little 
incentive to engage in costly monitoring of firm activities. Furthermore, Monks (2008) 
argue that shareholders have little control over boards and that many boards treat CEOs 
generously, which reflects a relationship that differs substantially from what is assumed 
to exist in the arm’s length model (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004). Moreover, Acharya et al. 
(2011) suggest that the market for corporate control can provide some discipline but it is 
hard to see it as effective in controlling operational decisions.  
Regarding the board of directors' role, Mace (1971) conclude that "directors serve 
as a source of advice and counsel, serve as some sort of discipline, and act in crisis 
situations"(p.178).9 Similarly, Aggarwal et al. (2013) argue that strong or independent 
boards could be valuable in times of crises, but are too far away from day-to-day 
operations to add much value to a firm. In this regard, seventy-five percent of 
respondents to Demb and Neubauer’s questionnaires (1992) report that the board "set 
strategy, corporate policies, overall direction, mission, vision" (p.44).10 According to the 
McKinsey Quarterly survey (2011) on governance, directors report that their boards have 
not increased the time spent on company strategy since the previous survey, conducted in 
February 2008—seven months before the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Moreover, 44 
percent of respondents say their boards simply review and approve management’s 
proposed strategies and only 21 percent of directors surveyed claim a complete 
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understanding of their companies’ current strategy  (McKinsey Global Survey results, 
2011).11 
In addition, there is an increasing tendency for U.S firms to adopt CEO duality 
structure12, which, in turn, is viewed by many as a reduction in the board's ability to 
fulfill its governance function. In this regard, Goyal and Park (2002) find that the 
probability of CEO turnover is likely to be less sensitive to performance in a firm with a 
combined CEO/chairman position, consistent with the notion that this combination of 
titles is associated with increased power over the board.13  
Concerning the board members, in general, they have fulltime jobs, such as 
CEOs, attorneys, or bankers. If not, a number of them serve on many boards, sometimes 
as many as ten simultaneously, resulted in an inability to devote sufficient effort to any 
one board (Adams et al., 2010). Given that they are busy with other activities, they are 
more reliant on management for information (Abdul Rahman & Ali, 2006). Also, Fich 
and Shivdasani (2006) suggest having busy directors is associated with weak corporate 
governance. Moreover, Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) document that busy directors are 
more likely to be appointed to the board when the CEO has more influence over the 
director-nominating process. Thus, the presence of many busy directors could indicate a 
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situation in which the CEO has too much power. According to McKinsey Quarterly 
survey (2011), some directors say that inadequate expertise about the business and 
insufficient time boards spent on their board duties, which they say is less than ideal for 
them to cover all board-related topics in proper depth, are probably two important reasons 
why just 26 percent of respondents characterize their boards’ overall performance as 
excellent or very good.14 These results indicate a need to reduce the reliance on the board 
as the most effective governance mechanism and looking for other supporting tools to 
strengthen the corporate governance’s monitoring role.   
To conclude, it is clear that the term "internal governance" has been used 
traditionally to describe different governance mechanisms such as board independence, 
audit committee independence, shareholders’ activism and institutional holding, while, 
mostly ignores the role of stakeholders inside the firm as a governance mechanism. In 
this regard, Acharya et al. (2011) argue that there are important stakeholders in the firm, 
particularly subordinate managers, who care about its future. Their model considers a 
partnership run by an old CEO who is about to retire and a young manager working under 
him who will be the future CEO. In such a structure, the CEO has a shorter horizon than 
his subordinates and he could simply decide to take all of the cash flow, investing nothing 
for the future. However, his subordinate managers have power to withdraw their 
contributions to the firm. As a result, the CEO is obligated to keep his subordinates 
motivated by investing part of the current cash flow and try to keep the company healthy 
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to create a future for his subordinate. Subsequently, CEO is compelled to act in a more 
public-spirited and far-sighted way, even if the CEO acts in his own short-term self-
interest and shareholders are dispersed and powerless.  Acharya et al. (2011) call this 
process "internal governance". 
In support to the above theory, Aggarwal et al. (2013) argue that the CEO is not 
the single productive figure in the company and a firm's young managers are critically 
important to a firm's day-to-day operations. As a result, the CEO needs the participation 
of his subordinates for current production by keeping them motivated, although the self-
interested incumbent CEO may want to extract all benefits at the expense of the other 
stakeholders. Furthermore, subordinates aspiring to be a future CEO may have different 
horizons relative to the preservation of firm value than does the incumbent CEO. As a 
result, the CEO obligates currently to invest to preserve value for the future. Aggarwal et 
al. (2013) call this bottom-up incentive scheme to induce effort from subordinates the 
"internal governance." They empirically examine the effect of internal governance on the 
firm investment and performance and document that the internal governance works best 
when the relative contributions of CEOs and managers to output are balanced. To do so, 
they use the ratio of the CEO's predicted compensation to the sum of the CEO's predicted 
compensation and the maximum predicted compensation of non-CEO executives to 
proxy for the strength of the relative importance of the CEO's contribution compared to 
the manager's in generating cash flow. Consistent with Acharya et al. (2011), they find 
that there is a hump-shaped relation between their measure of this relative contribution 
and corporate investment and between relative contribution and firm performance.15 To 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
15Acharya et al. (2011) show that internal governance is most effective when both the CEO and 





demonstrate, when the CEO is dominant in value creation, the CEO has little incentive to 
invest for the long run since the CEO only captures value today. On the other hand, the 
executives have little incentive to learn or exert effort because they do not capture the 
value they create today and the CEO has little incentive to invest for the long run. 
However, with intermediate levels of relative contribution, the long-term investment 
incentives are maximized. 
Furthermore, Landier et al. (2009) argue that independent executives may act as a 
bottom-up governance mechanism because the independently minded executives always 
impose more constraints on the CEO than executives who owe him their jobs. They 
develop a model in which subordinate executives (implementers) can enhance CEO 
(decision maker) to use more of the objective information in his decision process and to 
take less account of his own preferences, which raises the organization’s profitability. 
They consider an organization consisting of two employees with different functions: a 
decision maker who selects a project and an implementer who execute it. Both of them 
have intrinsic and possibly differing preferences over projects but share an interest in the 
project’s success. According to the shareholders, lack of congruence between internal 
stakeholders may impose an efficient implementation constraint that disciplines the 
decision-making process.  
Following Landier et al. (2009) theory, Landier et al. (2012) empirically measure 
the internal governance based on the degree of independence of the CEO's subordinates. 
They do this by computing the fraction of executives hired after the CEO took office 
(non-independent executives), and find that internal governance is said to be poor when 





CEO's subordinates and the level of profitability and shareholder returns following large 
acquisitions.  
Moreover, Jain, Jiang, and Mekhaimer (2013) test Acharya et al. (2011) theory to 
find that internal governance, exercised by subordinate managers, result in effective 
monitoring of a self-interested CEO through their contribution to improve a firm’s 
financial and operational efficiency and thereby improving stock market liquidity. They 
use a measure of internal governance based on the mean relative age difference between 
the top subordinate managers’ and the CEO as a proxy of the divergence in their horizons 
within the firm.  
Summary 
This chapter introduces an overview of corporate governance definitions. It 
describes the traditional corporate governance mechanisms including audit committee 
and board of directors with a brief literature review of the impact of these mechanisms on 
the earnings management practices. The review identifies that prior accounting research 
and the accounting profession has focused primarily on the board of directors and the 
audit committee mechanisms. However, previous literature on corporate governance 
suggests that traditional governance mechanisms' impact on such practices is 
contradictory and have limited influence on reducing the agency cost. These governance 
mechanisms could be valuable in times of crises, but are too far away from day-to-day 
operations. In addition, this review reveals an ignorance of the monitoring role of 
stakeholders inside the firm as an effective governance mechanism. Accordingly, the last 
section of the chapter highlight the effective role of subordinate managers to control and 





managers to monitor the self-interested CEO comes from two sources, their incentive and 
power. First, the subordinate managers' incentive to become the future CEO makes them 
more care about its future.  Second, subordinate managers can negatively affect the 
generation of the cash flows in the current period by withdrawing their contributions to 
the firm (Acharya et al., 2011) or simply choosing to be less enthusiastic in their work 
instead of formally disobey or enter in open conflict with their boss (Landier et al., 2009) 
to control the myopic behavior of the CEO. In summary, subordinate managers can force 
the CEO to act in a more public-spirited and far-sighted way. As a result, this chapter 
contributes to the literature by emphasizing the non-CEO executives' role as it is critically 
important in closely monitoring CEOs on a daily basis, which is impossible to be fulfilled 









The wave of accounting scandals that occurred recently in the international 
financial community raised many criticisms about the integrity of the financial reporting 
process and increased the need to strengthen the control of managers by setting up good 
governance structures. Accordingly, the link between corporate governance 
characteristics on one side and financial reporting quality and earnings management 
practices on the other side has been strongly discussed with an emphasis on specific 
governance mechanisms such as board of directors1 and audit committee, ignoring the 
oversight role of stakeholders inside the firm. However, a wide range of corporate 
governance studies argues that these traditional governance mechanisms have never been 
shown to be effective in reducing the agency cost (e.g., Acharya et al., 2011; Aggarwal et 
al., 2013; Burns et al. 2010; Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991; Hill & Phan, 1991; Monks, 
2008). As a result, many studies shed light on another governance mechanism; the 
subordinate managers’ monitoring role because of the possibility to monitor CEOs 
closely on a daily basis, which can’t be achieved through any other governance 
mechanism (e.g., Acharya et al., 2011; Aggarwal et al., 2013; Cheng et al., 2012; Landier 
et al., 2012). In this study, the researcher investigates the internal monitoring role by 
subordinate managers, proxied by the difference in horizon between subordinate 
managers and the incumbent CEO and also the aggregate compensation of the CEO 
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  Combs, Ketchen, Perryman, and Donahue (2007) state that “the bulk of theoretical and empirical 






relative to other executives, to control the CEO behavior in mitigating the earnings 
management practices.  
CEO Horizon and Earnings Management 
CEOs that are near retirement may have a different agenda than those still 
building and maintaining a career. Davidson, Xie, Xu, and Ning (2007) remark  
In the early years of executives’ working lives, these career concerns within their 
companies and in the external job market may motivate managers to serve 
shareholder interests. However, as executives approach retirement, these career 
concerns may be irrelevant or at least play a smaller role in guiding executive 
incentives on pre-turnover earnings management behavior and ‘‘incentives 
provided by current compensation become stronger’’ (p.487, Gibbons and 
Murphy 1992). (p. 47) 
 
Prior literature proposes that when CEOs approach retirement, they may lack 
incentives to act in the best interest of their firms and they may not be too concerned with 
the long-run performance of their organizations (Antia, Pantzalis, & Park, 2010). Instead, 
they may be more concerned with the short-term performance and, in turn, the potential 
for agency problems increases. According to Smith and Watts (1982), the manager with a 
short horizon prefers projects with lower net present values but higher current accounting 
earnings to projects with higher net present values but lower current earnings. Similarly, 
Antia et al. (2010) argue that a CEO with a decidedly short-term focus could boost short-
term profits by cutting costs, which is not a sustainable source of profit growth, rather 
than adding value by investing in positive NPV projects that do not generate immediate 
rewards. This phenomenon is commonly referred to as the horizon problem. The horizon 
problem, in turn, can affect the firm in numerous ways including, but not limited to, 
earnings management, suboptimal investments, and accounting fraud and other 





Concerning the earnings management practices, it is argued that CEOs have 
incentives to manage earnings upwards in their final years whether to increase the 
probability of being hired as directors after retirement in their former company or as an 
outside director in other company boards (Brickley, Linck, & Coles, 1999), to slow down 
the leak of unfavorable information in the case of poor performance that ends with forced 
departure (Murphy & Zimmerman, 1993), or to influence their final year pay2 (Ali & 
Zhang, 2013). In this regard, Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) state that outgoing CEOs 
approaching a known retirement or departure date make accounting or investment 
decisions to increase earnings (and earnings-based compensation) in their final years, at 
the expense of future earnings (the “horizon problem”) and outgoing CEOs in poorly 
performing firms threatened by termination make accounting or investment decisions in 
an attempt to cover up the firm’s deteriorating economic health (the “cover-up”). In 
addition, Dechow and Sloan (1991) and Barker and Mueller (2002) find R&D spending 
reductions for firms with older CEOs, which would boost profitability in the CEOs’ final 
years, but would more than likely reduce profits in the years subsequent to the CEOs’ 
departures. Furthermore, Conyon and Florou (2004) find that firms cut back on capital 
expenditures as CEOs become older. As a result, shorter CEO decision horizon suffers 
from substantially higher agency costs than those with longer CEO decision horizon 
(Antia et al., 2010). Hence, the first hypothesis is proposed as follows:  
H1: There is a negative relationship between the CEO horizon and the earnings 
management practices.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
2Shen (2003), Bloom and Milkovich (1998), and Gibbons and Murphy (1992) all find that CEOs 
nearing retirement receive, on average, a greater proportion of their pay in a form that relates pay to 






Age Difference and Earnings Management 
The subordinate managers’ strength in monitoring the self-interested CEO comes 
from their incentive in the firm.  Subordinate managers’ incentive is fueled by their desire 
to become the future CEO because much of the employee motivation comes from the 
prospect of a long-term career in the firm, including promotion. As indicated in the study 
of Agrawal, Knoeberd, and Tsoulouhas (2006), the incoming CEO, in most cases, is an 
insider. They report that over 80% (848 out of 1035) of all CEO successions in the period 
1974–1995 involved the promotion of an insider to the CEO position. Moreover, Cremers 
and Grinstein (2013) document that, over the years 1993 and 1996, 63% of the new 
CEOs were insiders, 31% were outsiders, and 7% were interim CEOs, compared with 
60%, 32%, and 9%, respectively, in the years 2003–2005. Accordingly, subordinate 
managers’ longer time horizon in the firm makes them care more about its future than the 
CEO, who gives no weight to the future welfare of the firm or its employees (Acharya et 
al., 2011). Hence, subordinate managers are serving as challengers and form a coalition 
opposed to the CEO when performance deteriorates (Ocasio, 1994). Generally, 
subordinate managers will be less likely to support earnings management practices since 
positive earnings management is reversed in future years3, and they will not want to 
mortgage the company’s future since they will still be in office (Davidson et al., 2007). 
This difference in appropriation horizons between the incumbent CEO and the 
subordinate managers is the fundamental source driving the internal governance. In this 
regard, Acharya et al. (2011) view the firm as a composition of diverse agents with 
different horizons, interests, and opportunities for misappropriation and growth.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  






Acharya et al. (2011) argue that the internal governance is more effective for the 
firms with CEOs close to retirement. Moreover, Aggarwal et al. (2013) confirm that the 
greater divergence in career horizons (larger age differences between the CEO and 
subordinate managers) is accompanied with more effective internal governance. The 
reason behind this argument is that the older the CEO than the remaining managers on 
average, the shorter the CEO's horizon, and thus increase the probability for the 
subordinates of being the next CEO. Conversely, if the CEO is younger than the other 
managers or similar in age, then internal governance should be completely ineffective. In 
this case, the CEO will already have a long horizon (or similar horizon) while the other 
managers will have little hope of becoming the next CEO and so be unwilling to exert 
effort. To conclude, the larger the age difference between the CEO and the subordinate 
managers, the more effective the internal governance, and the less likely the company 
will engage in earnings management practices to meet short-term earnings targets at the 
expense of the long-term profitability.4 To capture the effectiveness of the internal 
governance comes from executives’ incentive to become the future CEO, the next 
hypothesis is as follows:  
H2: Internal governance is more effective in mitigating earnings management 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
4 Fischer and Rosenzweig (1995) define earnings management as referring to the actions of a 
manager which serve to increase (decrease) current reported earnings of the unit for which the manager is 
responsible without generating a corresponding increase (decrease) in the long-term economic profitability 





CEO Power and Earnings Management 
Subordinate managers have the power to force the CEO to act in a more public-
spirited and far-sighted way even if the CEO acts in his own short-term self-interest. 
Their power represented by choosing to be less enthusiastic in their work instead of 
formally disobey or enter in open conflict with their boss (Landier et al., 2009). In 
addition, they have the ability to withdraw their contributions to the firm. In this regard, 
Acharya et al. (2011) remark 
The mechanism through which they have an impact in our model is not           
through coordinated action or through appeal to a board of directors, but rather 
through their propensity to get demotivated. This is neither exit nor voice, in the 
felicitous terminology of Hirschman (1970), nor active whistle blowing as in 
Dyck, Morse, and Zingales (2010); but, instead, is an uncoordinated and even 
implicit strike. (p.717) 
 
Accordingly, to consider the interest of subordinate managers in order to generate 
cash flows in the current period, the CEO has to use more of the objective information in 
his decision process and to take less account of his own preferences, which raises the 
organization’s profitability (Landier et al., 2009).  
In this regard, the managerial power approach predicts a correlation between 
power5 and rents.6 The greater the CEO’s power, the larger his or her rents will tend to be 
(Bebchuk & Fried, 2004). Consistent with this view, Aggarwal et al. (2013) point out that 
if the CEO is very powerful, he does not need his subordinates' cooperation and internal 
governance will not constrain the CEO's extraction of rents. Similarly, Haleblian and 
Finkelstein (1993) state that dominant CEOs may nullify the contribution of members 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
5	  Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira (2005) define powerful CEOs as those who can consistently 
influence key decisions in their firms, in spite of potential opposition from other executives. 
6 Economists use the term “rents” to refer to excess returns that firms or individuals obtain due to 





with less power. Furthermore, Galema, Lensink, and Mersland (2009) argue that 
powerful CEOs tend to take all the major decisions, while less powerful CEOs take 
decisions in consensus with the other board members. In addition, Eisenhardt and 
Bourgeois (1988) argue that the less dominant the CEO is, the greater the share of 
information and the more the consensus in decision making. As power circulation theory 
asserts, with low power CEOs, other executives provide sufficient and effective 
monitoring to constrain and counterbalance the potential self-serving actions of CEOs 
and to protect shareholders, therefore, there is no need for an additional, and potentially 
counterproductive, layer of control in the form of an outside director dominated board 
(Combs et al., 2007).  
From another perspective, Larcker and Tayan (2012) find that companies with 
powerful CEOs are less likely to have formal succession plans, and powerful CEOs are 
more likely to influence the outcome of a succession when it takes place. In this regard, 
Zajac and Westphal (1996) argue that powerful CEOs play an integral role in the 
selection of their successor, and that they are more likely to drive the choice of a 
successor toward one with the similar characteristics to themselves. These findings 
indicate that with more powerful CEO, subordinates managers’ monitoring role 
diminishes, either for their inability to impose their opinions or for losing their incentive 
and hope to take the CEO’s place. Based on the previous discussion, the more powerful 
the CEO is, the less effective the subordinate managers’ monitoring of the CEO which 
provides us with the following hypothesis:  
H3: Internal governance is more effective in mitigating earnings management 





Human Capital Industries and Earnings Management 
It is assumed that internal governance is more effective when the firm’s value is 
more tied to firm-specific human capital, particularly in industries that typically 
emphasize internal promotions and long-term employment (Acharya et al., 2011). In such 
firms, subordinate mangers have unique skills. Given the need of the incumbent CEO to 
his subordinates’ efforts to generate the cash flaws in the current period7, the subordinate 
managers have more importance and power on the CEO’s actions in such industries, 
where it is difficult to replace an executive with another. Unlike capital-intensive 
industry, insiders in human intensive industry are less comparable to outsiders because of 
their proprietary knowledge, which is believed to provide their firms a competitive 
advantage in the marketplace.  
From other point of view, Agrawal et al. (2006) find that the choice of an insider 
as CEO is more likely in firms-specific human capital. Furthermore, Parrino (1997) 
shows that the frequency of outside succession varies considerably across industries and 
decreases with firm specific human capital, where CEOs are more costly to replace and 
are harder to identify. Given that the effectiveness of subordinate managers’ monitoring 
depends on the probability of being hired as the incoming CEO, the subordinate 
managers in human capital intensive industries exert internal governance on the 
incumbent CEO in order to protect their future in the firm. The reason of this argument is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
7	  CIMA, 2007 attribute the generation of cash flows to three main categories of intellectual capital 
as follows: human capital 54%, organizational capital 8%, and relational capital 38%, defining each of 
them as follows: “Human capital refers to the activities that create knowledge based upon experience that 
ultimately contributes value to the firm. Organizational capital includes databases, technology, control 
systems, and other processes and procedures that assist the company in storing or utilizing the knowledge 
created by its employees. Finally, relationship capital consists of the associations with customers, suppliers 
and other stakeholders essential to the firm’s economic sustainability”. Also, Acharya et al., 2011 argue 
that there are three ingredients to produce the firm’s cash flow: the firm’s capital stock, the CEO’s ability to 





that the likelihood of inside succession in these industries is high. Based on the previous 
discussion, the forth hypothesis is formed as follows:  
H4: Internal governance is effective in mitigating earnings management only in 






SAMPLE COLLECTION AND RESEAECH METHODOLOGY 
Sample Selection and Data Sources 
In this section, the researcher explains the data collection procedures as well as 
the data sources. The researcher uses Standard & Poor’s ExecuComp database to collect 
annual data for the top executives in S&P 1500 firms. The database includes data on CEO 
and subordinate managers’ ages, appointment dates, dates for leaving the executives’ 
compensation data, and other attributes. Following Acharya et al. (2011) and Bebchuk et 
al. (2011), the researcher limits the sample to include only the top 4 subordinate 
managers, in addition to the CEO.1 
The sample includes 10 years of data for S&P 1500 firms for the period from 
2000 to 2010. Company ID, fiscal year, total assets, total current assets, cash holdings, 
current liabilities, property, plant and equipment, account receivables, cash flow from 
operations, net income and market value are derived from Compustat database. Data on 
institutional holdings is collected from the 13F fillings summarized in the CDA/Spectrum 
database. Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) Governance index, GIM, is collected from 
the investor responsibility research center.  Firm age is calculated based on the 
Compustat data.  
The sample comprises all Compustat firms in the 1999–2010 period (1999’s data 
is used to calculate the change in variables regressor in year 2000, and so forth). The 
researcher employs the following filters: exclude financial institutions and utility firms 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
1 Acharya et al. (2011) shows in Table II, that nearly 80% of new CEOs are appointed from the 
top four executives in the firm in the previous year (top four because one of the top five is typically the 





because their accounting is different from the rest of the companies. In addition, the 
researcher excludes firms with missing accruals and firms whose current accruals exceed 
lagged assets. Moreover, to estimate the coefficients in the first stage of Jones (1991) 
different models, the researcher run one regression for every year for any industry that 
contained at least 30 firms. 
Variables Measurements 
1) Measures of Internal Governance  
This study uses two different proxies for internal governance. First, the researcher 
uses the age difference between the CEO and his subordinates to measure the difference 
in appropriation horizon. Second, the researcher employs Bebchuk et al. (2011) CEO pay 
slice (CPS) to measure the CEO’s dominance relative to other executives in the firm. 
Difference in Horizon (Age Difference)   
Acharya et al. (2011) argue that the difference in horizon between the CEO and 
the subordinate managers represent the fundamental source to exert pressure and monitor 
the CEO. The CEO has a short horizon; therefore, he could simply decide to take all of 
the cash flow, investing nothing for the future. However, he needs the young manager’s 
effort in order to generate the cash flow. In the same time, subordinate manager’s horizon 
is extended beyond the CEO horizon. If subordinate managers see that the CEO will 
leave nothing behind, they will be less motivated to exert effort, and cash flow will fall 
significantly. Within this managerial structure, firm control need not be exerted just top-
down, or from outside; it can also be asserted bottom-up.  
Acharya et al. (2011) suggest that internal governance may not be effective when 





the number of years the CEO has been in office, to proxy for career horizon. However, as 
indicated by Jain et al. (2013), tenure has three major problems as follows: “First, it 
reflects only the past horizon and may not infer anything about the executives’ expected 
future horizon. Second, it ignores any executive experience outside the current firm. 
Third, it ignores the cumulative learning and experience of executive beyond their 
executive position” (p.14). They argue that age can avoid these problems. Following Jain 
et al. (2013), the researcher uses the mean relative age differences between the CEO and 
the top four subordinate managers as a proxy of the divergence in their horizons within 
the firm. The main idea behind the effectiveness of subordinates managers’ monitoring is 
the conflict of interests between the myopic CEO, with short-term horizon, and 
subordinates managers, with long-term interest in the firm. Hence, the larger the age 
difference, the stronger the subordinate managers’ desire to monitor the CEO and the 
more effective the internal governance. This measure is calculated as follows: 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙  𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 𝐶𝐸𝑂!𝑠  𝐴𝑔𝑒!.! − 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒  𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑠!  𝐴𝑔𝑒!,! 
                   Where 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐴𝑔𝑒!.!is the age of CEO and 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑠′𝐴𝑔𝑒!,! is 
the mean age of the top four subordinate managers for firm i at year t. 
CEO Pay Slice  
To capture the ability of subordinate managers to monitor the CEO, the researcher 
adopts Bebchuk et al. (2011) CEO pay slice. The CEO pay slice measures CEO 
dominance relative to the other executives. This measure reflects the relative importance 
of the CEO as well as the extent to which the CEO is able to extract rents. CEO pay slice 
is an inverse measure to the internal governance. The CEO pay slice is computed as the 





executives team. Acharya et al. (2011) suggest that if the CEO dominates the 
contribution, he has no desire to limit his rent extraction in order to provide incentives for 
the subordinates. The CEO dominance, represented by high CPS ratio, entails that 
subordinate managers are powerless and their ability to monitor the CEO is weak and 
internal governance would be less effective. Bebchuk et al. (2011) CEO Pay Slice ratio is 
defined as follows:  
𝐶𝐸𝑂  𝑃𝐴𝑌  𝑆𝐿𝐼𝐶𝐸!,! =
𝐶𝐸𝑂  𝑃𝐴𝑌!,!
𝑇𝑂𝑃  5  𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿  𝑃𝐴𝑌!,!
 
Where 𝐶𝐸𝑂  𝑃𝐴𝑌!,! is the CEO’s total compensation, including salary, bonus, 
other annual pay, the total value of restricted stock granted that year, the Black and 
Scholes value of stock options granted that year, long- term incentive payouts, and all 
other total compensation. 𝑇𝑂𝑃  5  𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿  𝑃𝐴𝑌!,! is the total compensation of the top 5 
executives including the CEO. 
CPS as a proxy for CEO dominance or centrality has a powerful explanatory 
variable, captures many observable and unobservable dimensions of the CEO’s role in 
the top team, capture factors beyond the ones captured by other studies such as whether 
the CEO also chairs the board, and directly reflects internal agency/governance problems 
(Bebchuk et al., 2011).  
2) Measures of Earnings Management 
Most empirical earnings management studies have relied primarily on accruals-
based measures to estimate the degree of manipulation. Accruals management approach 
captures the effect of accounting estimates, changes in those estimates, and changes in 
accounting methods (DeAngelo, 1986). The research design of the accruals-based models 





accruals. Discretionary accruals, in turn, are used as a proxy for earnings management. 
The researcher calculates the discretionary accruals by employing 3 steps as follows: Step 
1: Measure total accruals using the balance-sheet approach in which total accruals are the 
change in non-cash current assets less the change in current liabilities, excluding the 
current portion of long-term debt, less depreciation, deflating all variables by the 
beginning of the year assets to overcome heteroskedasticity. Step 2: Estimate the 
nondiscretionary accruals by applying both Jones and modified Jones models in their 
cross sectional versions, where the parameters of the models are estimated by using 
cross-sectional data rather than time-series data. Therefore, parameter estimates are 
industry and year specific rather than firm specific. In addition, the researcher uses the 
current version of both models. Step 3: Calculate the discretional accruals which are the 
difference between the actual accruals (step 1) and the expected accruals (step 2).  
Jones Model  
The nondiscretionary accruals (step 2) are estimated after controlling for changes 
in a firm's economic conditions using a two-stage approach. In the first stage, the 
coefficients of the nondiscretionary accruals are determined by regressing the total 
accruals on the change in sales (∆REV) to control for the changes in working-capital 
accruals caused by the changes in underlying economic activities before managerial 
manipulation, such as accounts receivable, inventory, and accounts payable. In addition, 
the gross level of property, plant, and equipment (PPE) to control for nondiscretionary 
accruals associated with the depreciation expense. Therefore, NDA is computed as 
indicated below to yield estimates of the coefficient 𝛼!, 𝛽!!  , 𝛽!!  : 






𝑇𝐴!"= Total accruals for firm i in year t 
A = Assets 
∆  REV = Change in revenues  
PPE = Gross property, plant, and equipment 
𝜀!"= Error term for firm i in year t 
In the second stage, the estimated parameters from the above regression, namely 
𝛼!,  𝛽!!  ,𝛽!!  , are combined with TA, ∆REV and PPE data from each firm as follows:  
𝑁𝐷𝐴!" = 𝛼! 1  /  𝐴!"!! + 𝛽!!   ∆  𝑅𝐸𝑉!" /𝐴!"!! +   𝛽!!    𝑃𝑃𝐸!"  /𝐴!"!!  
And the residual accruals (DA) are the discretionary component of total accruals 
computed as follows: 𝐷𝐴!" = 𝑇𝐴!" - 𝑁𝐷𝐴!" 
Modified Jones Model  
Over the years, modified Jones model was considered the most widely used 
model in detecting earnings management. The modified Jones model replaces the 
changes in revenues with the changes in cash revenues (the change in revenues minus the 
change in the accounts receivable). This modification stems from the fact that it is easier 
for managers to manage earnings by exercising discretion over the recognition of revenue 
on credit sales rather than over the recognition of revenue on cash sales. Unlike the time 
series analysis2, in cross-sectional analysis, the cash revenue is used for the estimation of 
the parameters of nondiscretionary accruals (the first stage of step 2) (e.g., DeFond & 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
2 The time-series modified Jones model follows the first stage of the Jones model, however, in the 
second stage, it estimates the nondiscretionary accruals by multiplying the estimated coefficient of the 






Park, 1997; Dechow, Richardson, & Tuna, 2003; Kothari, Leone, & Wasley, 2005; 
Subramanyam, 1996). Therefore, this difference affects both stages of the earnings 
management detection procedure: estimation of nondiscretionary accruals coefficients 
(first stage) and identification of the discretionary accruals (second stage). Hence, in the 
first stage, to estimate the coefficients of the nondiscretionary accruals, total accruals are 
regressed on the change in cash sales (∆REV- ∆  AR), and the gross level of property, 
plant, and equipment (PPE) as indicated below: 
𝑇𝐴!"/𝐴!"!! = 𝛼! 1/  𝐴!"!! + 𝛽!!   ∆  𝑅𝐸𝑉!" −   ∆  𝐴𝑅!" /  𝐴!"!!   + 𝛽!! 𝑃𝑃𝐸!"  /𝐴!"!!   +
  𝜀!"       
Where 
𝑇𝐴!"= Total accruals for firm i in year t 
A = Assets 
∆  REV = Change in revenues  
AR = Accounts receivable 
PPE = Gross property, plant, and equipment 
𝜀!"= Error term for firm i in year t 
In the second stage, the estimated parameters from the above regression, namely 
𝛼!, 𝛽!!  , 𝛽!!  , are combined with TA, (∆REV-∆AR), and PPE data from each firm as 
follows:  
𝑁𝐷𝐴!" = 𝛼! 1  /  𝐴!"!! + 𝛽!!   ∆  𝑅𝐸𝑉!" −   ∆  𝐴𝑅!" /𝐴!"!! +   𝛽!!    𝑃𝑃𝐸!"  /𝐴!"!!  
And the residual accruals (DA) are the discretionary component of total accruals 






Current Version of Jones and Modified Jones Models 
The researcher employs the current accruals version of both the Jones and 
modified Jones model in which current accruals are used as a dependent variable and 
only the change in revenues (or cash revenues in case of the modified Jones model) as the 
explanatory variable (omits the PP&E regressor) as indicated in Table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1 
Steps of Discretionary Accruals Using the Current Version of Jones and Modified Jones 
Models 
 
 Current version of Jones model Current version of Modified 
Jones model 
Step 1: Measure the 
current accruals (CA) 
The change in non-cash 
working capital, (∆ Current 
Assets - ∆ Cash) – (∆ Current 
Liabilities - ∆ Current 
maturities of long-term debt - 
∆ Income taxes payable), 
deflating all variables by the 
beginning of the year assets to 
overcome heteroskedasticity.  
The same 
Step 2: Estimate the 
nondiscretionary accruals. 
Stage 1: To estimate the 
coefficient, namely 𝛼!, 
𝛽!!  , 𝛽!!  , of the 
nondiscretionary accruals 
using cross sectional data 
Stage 2: To use the 
coefficient from the 




𝐶𝐴!"/𝐴!"!! = 𝛼! 1/  𝐴!"!!
+ 𝛽!!   ∆  𝑅𝐸𝑉!"  
/  𝐴!"!!   + 𝜀!"     
Where 𝐶𝐴!"= Current accruals 
for firm i in year t. 
 
𝑁𝐷𝐴!"
= 𝛼! 1  /  𝐴!"!!




= 𝛼! 1/  𝐴!"!!
+ 𝛽!!   ∆  𝑅𝐸𝑉!" −   ∆  𝐴𝑅!"
/𝐴!"!! + 𝜀!"     
Where 𝐶𝐴!"= Current accruals 
for firm i in year t. 
𝑁𝐷𝐴!"
= 𝛼! 1  /  𝐴!"!!
+ 𝛽!!   ∆  𝑅𝐸𝑉!" −   ∆  𝐴𝑅!"
/𝐴!"!!  
Step 3: Compute the 
discretionary component 
of the current accruals as 
the residual accruals (DA) 






Previous studies suggest that firms’ characteristics might impact the earnings 
management of the firm. To rule out the possibility that the results are driven by other 
factors than the internal governance, the researcher controls for a set of control variables. 
Following Cheng and Warfield (2005), Jiang, Petroni, and Wang, (2010), and 
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), the researcher controls for firm size (Size), growth 
opportunity using market-to- book ratio (MTB), lagged leverage (Leverage), and Sales 
Growth. The researcher also controls for the standard deviation of cash flows from 
operations (StdCashFlow) and the standard deviation of revenues (StdRev) to account for 
firm-specific volatility (Hribar & Nichols, 2007). In addition, the model includes a set of 
dummy variables to proxy corporate governance features following Gompers et al. 
(2003), firm age (Old firm), SIC industry indicators, and exchanges indicators.  
Empirical Model 
In this section, the researcher presents the empirical model to investigate the 
impact of internal governance on earnings management. The researcher uses the 
following regression model to test the hypotheses: 
Discretionary  accruals  !,! =
  𝛼 + 𝛽!  𝐶𝐸𝑂!𝑠  𝐴𝑔𝑒!,! +   𝛽!  𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙  𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒!,!(𝐴𝑔𝑒  𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒)+   𝛽!  𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒!,! +
  𝛽!  𝑀𝑇𝐵!,! +   𝛽!  𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠  𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ!,!   + 𝛽!  𝑆𝑡𝑑  𝑅𝑒𝑣!,! + 𝛽!  𝑆𝑡𝑑  𝐶𝐹𝑂!.! + 𝛽!  𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 +
  𝛽!  𝑂𝑙𝑑  𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠  ! +   𝛽!"  𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠! + 𝑆𝐼𝐶! + 𝐸𝑋𝐶𝐻! +     𝜀!,!                                                    (1) 
Where Discretionary  accruals  !,! is calculated using different earnings 
management models as discussed in section 5.2.2, 𝐶𝐸𝑂!𝑠  𝐴𝑔𝑒!,!   is the CEO’s age for 
firm i year t. Internal governance is the variable of interest and is calculated as explained 
in section 5.2.1., 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒!,! is the natural logarithm of the lagged total assets, 𝑀𝑇𝐵!,! is the 





growth over the current and previous four years, Std Rev is the standard deviation of 
sales, Std CFO is the standard deviation of cash flows from operations, Leverage is the 
total liabilities deflated by total assets of the firm, Old firm is a dummy variable that 
equals one if a firm is listed on Compustat for more than 20 years and zero otherwise, 
Loss is a dummy variable that is equal one if the firm encounter a negative net income in 
the year t. The model also controls for industry and exchange variations by including 







In this chapter, the researcher presents the empirical results of the relationship 
between internal governance and earnings management. Theses results are based on S&P 
1500 U.S firms and covers the period from 2000 to 2010.  
Descriptive Statistics 
In this section, the researcher presents the descriptive statistics for the key 
variables. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for earnings management measures, 
internal governance measures as well as other control variables. Absolute discretionary 
accruals of Jones (1991) model have a mean of 0.555 and a median of 0.095. These 
statistics are very close to the one reported for the Modified Jones (1991) model, where 
the reported mean equal to 0.556 and the median equal to 0.094. On the other hand, the 
current accruals using Jones (1991) model is equal to 0.153 compared to 0.142 for the 
current version of modified Jones (1991) model. 
For internal governance, there are two main measures as discussed in chapter 5. 
As indicate in Table 1, the researcher uses the difference in horizons between the CEO 
and his subordinates as the primary measure of internal governance. The researcher 
employs the difference in age between the CEO and the other top subordinate managers 
in the firm as a proxy for the difference in horizon. Following Bebchuk et al. (2011),	  the 
researcher limits the sample to include only top five executives in the firm. The statistics 
shows that for the S&P 1500 firms, the CEO age ranges from 31 years old to 90 years 
old. The CEO mean and Median age is 54 years old. These statistics are very close to 





sample that covers the period from 1992 to 2008. On the other hand, the subordinate 
managers’ age ranges from 29 years old to 81 years old. The mean and median of 
subordinate managers’ age is 50 years old. It is worth mentioning that both the CEO age 
and subordinate managers age have similar mean and median, which suggest that the age 
distribution of both ages is normal. The difference in age between the CEO and his 
subordinate managers is 3.90, which is very comparable to the difference reported by 
other studies such as Acharya et al. (2011) and Jain et al. (2013). The other measure of 
internal governance is the CEO pay slice. The researcher finds that CEO pay slice ranges 
from 0.180 to 0.590, which means that the CEO fraction of total compensation ranges 
from almost 20 to 60%. The CEO pay slice has a mean of 0.385 and a median of 0.386. 
These results also confirm a normal distribution for the CEO pay slice. In addition, Table 
1 includes statistics for other control variables.  
Regression Results 
Difference in Horizon, CEO Age, and Earnings Management 
Table 2 reports the main regression results for this study. Using equation (1), the 
researcher tests the impact of internal governance on earnings management after 
controlling for other variables that might impact the level of discretionary accruals as 
discussed in chapter 5. The table reports the results for four different measures of 
earnings management, Jones (1991) model in the first column, the current version of 
Jones (1991) model in the second column, the Modified Jones model in the third column 
and the current version of the Modified Jones model in the last column. In this table, the 
main variable of interest is the internal governance measured by the age difference 





accruals specification, the researcher finds the coefficient of internal governance to be 
negative and statistically significant. These results suggest that internal governance, 
exercised by subordinate managers, can reduce the earnings management of the firm. The 
results show that monitoring by subordinate managers with longer horizon than the CEO 
is actually effective in reducing earnings management practices and switch the firm focus 
to long-term perspective. In addition, the researcher controls for the CEO age to make 
sure that the results are not capturing other CEO characteristics. The researcher finds that 
there is a positive (negative) and significant relationship between the CEO age (CEO 
horizon) and earnings management. These results suggest that as the CEO age (CEO 
horizon) increase (decrease), it is more likely that the CEO will engage in earnings 
management to boost the current earnings. The control variables are also consistent with 
the previous literature. For example, the researcher finds a positive relationship between 
volatility of cash flow from operations, sales growth, and volatility of sales revenue and 
earnings management. These results are consistent with Jiang, Petroni, and Wang (2010).  
CEO Power and Earnings Management 
In Table 3, the researcher investigates another dimension of internal governance. 
The researcher uses the CEO pay slice as a proxy of the ability of subordinate managers 
to monitor the CEO and as an alternative measure of internal governance. Table 3 reports 
the regression results for the following equation: 
Discretionary  accruals  !,! =
  𝛼 + 𝛽!  𝐶𝐸𝑂!𝑠  𝐴𝑔𝑒!,! +   𝛽!  𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙  𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒!,!(𝐴𝑔𝑒  𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒)+
  𝛽!  𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙  𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒!,!(𝐶𝐸𝑂  𝑃𝑎𝑦  𝑆𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒)+   𝛽!  𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒!,! +   𝛽!  𝑀𝑇𝐵!,! +
  𝛽!  𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠  𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ!,!   + 𝛽!  𝑆𝑡𝑑  𝑅𝑒𝑣!,! + 𝛽!  𝑆𝑡𝑑  𝐶𝐹𝑂!.! + 𝛽!  𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 +






The researcher finds that CEO pay slice coefficients are positive and statistically 
significant for the Jones (1991) model and Modified Jones model. However, the current 
version of the Jones and Modified Jones model are insignificant. Generally, the results 
suggest that as the CEO power (subordinate managers’ power) increases (decreases) the 
firm tends to have more earnings management. These results show that the powerful CEO 
is inclined to manage earnings. These findings are consistent with the theory of Acharya 
et al. (2011). They suggest that if the CEO has more power over the top team, he will be 
unconcerned to motivate his subordinate managers by investing for their future. 
Interestingly, the researcher still finds a negative and significant relationship 
between age difference and earnings management after adding the CEO pay slice to the 
model. The magnitude of the coefficients is very comparable to the one reported in Table 
2. The results suggest that the internal governance is multi-dimensional concept, in which 
both dimensions of internal governance are significant in the regression specification. As 
reported in Table 3, the CEO age is still positive and significant. Overall, these results 
suggest that internal governance is effective in mitigating the myopic CEO behavior of 
managing earnings.  
Human Capital Industries and Earnings Management 
Acharya et al. (2011) suggest that subordinate managers can be an effective part 
of internal governance only if they have an interest in the future of the firm. Such interest 
comes from greater independence from CEO, due to the firm or the industry specific 
knowledge. In such cases, non-CEO executives are able to exert more influence on the 





In human capital-intensive industries, managers are required to engage in the 
industry and the firm-specific learning efforts prior to their appointment for an executive 
position, which increases their importance, power, and influence on the CEO. In this 
study, the researcher conducts a test to examine the impact of industry specific learning 
on the effectiveness of internal governance. Pantzalis and Park (2009) provide a rank of 
Fama and French 48 industries based on excess value of human capital.1 The researcher 
follows Pantzalis and Park (2009) to divide the sample into top 12 human capital 
industries and bottom 12 human capital industries.  
Table 4 Panel A reports the results for the top 12 human capital industries, while 
panel B reports the results for the bottom 12 human capital industries. The results suggest 
that internal governance is only effective in reducing the earnings management practices 
for human intensive capital industries. The researcher finds internal governance measured 
by the age difference between CEO and his subordinate managers to be negative and 
significant only for top 12 human capital industries presented in panel A. However, for 
bottom 12 human capital industries subsample, the findings indicate that age difference is 
insignificant for different measures of earnings management. These results are in line 
with Acharya et al. (2011) in which internal governance is only effective when 
subordinate managers are important and have the power to influence the CEO decisions.   
On the other hand, the researcher finds mixed results for the second measure of internal 
governance, the CEO pay slice. In Table 4 panel A, top 12 human capital industries, the 
CEO pay slice is positive and significant for both Jones and modified Jones models. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
1 Pantzalis and Park (2009) measure excess value of human capital as follows: first, they compute 
the industry-median value for the ratio of market value of common equity to total number of employees 
(EV). Then, they multiply the industry median EV by the firm’s number of employees to obtain an imputed 





These results are similar to the one reported in the first model specification. While the 
primary measure of internal governance, age difference, is not significant for the bottom 
12 human capital industries, the researcher finds CEO pay slice to be negative and 
significant for the current version of Jones and modified Jones models. For both 
subsamples, the researcher finds that the coefficients of CEO age to be positive and 
significant for different earnings management measures. The results confirm the positive 
relationship between CEO age and earnings management.  Overall, the results suggest 
that internal governance is effective in reducing earnings management only for firms that 
provide a greater independence from CEO, due to the required industry specific 
knowledge. 
Internal Governance, Conventional Governance, and Earnings Management 
Previous literature suggests that other governance mechanisms also might affect 
the earnings management practices of the firm. To exclude this possibility, the researcher 
follows Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) and control for institutional ownership and 
Gompers et al., (2003) governance index. Table 5 panel A reports the regression results 
for the following regression: 
Discretionary  accruals  !,! =
  𝛼 + 𝛽!  𝐶𝐸𝑂!𝑠  𝐴𝑔𝑒!,! +   𝛽!  𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙  𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒!,! 𝐴𝑔𝑒  𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 +
  𝛽!  𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙  𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒!,! 𝐶𝐸𝑂  𝑃𝑎𝑦  𝑆𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒 +   𝛽!𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙  𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝!,! +
𝛽!  𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 +   𝛽!  𝐷𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝  +  𝛽!  𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒!,! +   𝛽!  𝑀𝑇𝐵!,! +   𝛽!  𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠  𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ!,!   +
𝛽!"  𝑆𝑡𝑑  𝑅𝑒𝑣!,! + 𝛽!!  𝑆𝑡𝑑  𝐶𝐹𝑂!.! + 𝛽!"  𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 +   𝛽!"  𝑂𝑙𝑑  𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠  ! +   𝛽!"𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠! +
𝑆𝐼𝐶! + 𝐸𝑋𝐶𝐻! +     𝜀!,!                                                                                                        (3) 
 
The researcher measures the institutional ownership as the percentage of shares 
owned by intuitional investors. The researcher also includes a dummy variable for 





Gompers et al. (2003) governance index and 0 otherwise. Further, the researcher includes 
a dummy variable for dictatorship firms. Following Gompers et al. (2003) and 
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), the researcher defines dictatorship firm if it score 13 
or more in GIM governance index, otherwise dictatorship is equal to zero. The regression 
results in Table 5 panel A shows that even after controlling for other governance 
mechanism, the researcher still finds a negative and significant relationship between 
internal governance and earnings management. The results are robust to the inclusion of 
conventional governance measures. In Table 5 panel B, following Bergstresser and 
Philippon (2006), the researcher includes the other GIM governance categories in the 
regression model as follows: 
Discretionary  accruals  !,! =
  𝛼 + 𝛽!  𝐶𝐸𝑂!𝑠  𝐴𝑔𝑒!,! +   𝛽!  𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙  𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒!,! 𝐴𝑔𝑒  𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 +
  𝛽!  𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙  𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒!,! 𝐶𝐸𝑂  𝑃𝑎𝑦  𝑆𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒 +   𝛽!𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙  𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝!,! +
𝛽!  𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 +   𝛽!  7 ≤ 𝐺 ≤ 9+   𝛽!  10 ≤ 𝐺 ≤ 12+   𝛽!  𝐷𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝  +   𝛽!  𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒!,! +
  𝛽!"  𝑀𝑇𝐵!,! +   𝛽!!  𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠  𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ!,!   + 𝛽!"  𝑆𝑡𝑑  𝑅𝑒𝑣!,! + 𝛽!"  𝑆𝑡𝑑  𝐶𝐹𝑂!.! +
𝛽!"  𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 +   𝛽!"  𝑂𝑙𝑑  𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠  ! +   𝛽!"𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠! + 𝑆𝐼𝐶! + 𝐸𝑋𝐶𝐻! +     𝜀!,!                       (4) 
 
These regression results suggest that the relationship between internal governance 
and earnings management is still robust after controlling other governance mechanisms. 
The researcher shows that internal governance measured by the age difference between 
CEO and his subordinates is negative and significant for different model specifications 











The researcher investigates whether the subordinate managers have the incentive 
and power to monitor the self-interested behavior of the CEO. This investigation sheds 
light on how the constraints of the subordinate managers over the myopic CEO actions 
can mitigate the earnings management practices. Subordinate managers have longer 
horizon in the firm compared to the CEO and, accordingly, care more about its future. 
Moreover, they have the power to withdraw their contributions to the firm, which will 
negatively affect the generation of cash flow in the current period.  The researcher uses 
the mean age difference between the top four subordinate managers and the CEO to 
proxy for their difference in appropriation horizon and to capture the inspiring 
subordinate managers’ incentive to be the incoming CEO. In addition, following 
Bebchuk et al. (2011), the researcher uses the CEO compensation relative to subordinate 
managers’ compensation, CEO Pay Slice ratio, to capture the influence of subordinate 
managers in the firm as well as the extent to which the CEO is able to extract rents. On 
the other hand, following most empirical earnings management studies which have relied 
primarily on accruals-based measures, the researcher employs different versions of Jones 
(1991) model to estimate the degree of manipulation. 
The findings suggest that internal governance, exercised by subordinate 
managers, can reduce the earnings management of the firm. The results show that the 
larger the age differences between the CEO and the subordinate managers, the more 
effective the internal governance, and the less likely the company will engage in earnings 





term profitability. The reason behind this argument is that the greater divergence in career 
horizons increases the probability for the subordinates of being the next CEO. In 
addition, the researcher controls for the CEO age to make sure that the results are not 
capturing any other CEO characteristics, and finds that there is a positive (negative) 
relationship between the CEO age (CEO horizon) and earnings management. The results 
suggest that as the CEO age (CEO horizon) increase (decrease), it is more likely that the 
CEO will manage earnings. This indicates that when CEOs approach retirement, they 
may lack incentives to act in the best interest of their firms and they may not be too 
concerned with the long-run performance of their organizations. Instead, they may have a 
different agenda than those still building and maintaining a career. Thus, they may be 
more concerned with the short-term performance.  
Furthermore, the results show a negative relationship between subordinate 
managers’ power and earnings management. These results suggest that the powerful 
subordinate managers can provide effective monitoring to constrain and counterbalance 
the potential self-serving actions of the CEOs, otherwise, their ability to monitor the CEO 
is weak and internal governance would be less effective. These findings are consistent 
with Acharya et al. (2011) theory, in which they suggest that if the CEOs dominate the 
contribution, they have no desire to limit their rent extraction in order to provide 
incentives for the subordinates. 
Further, the researcher shows that internal monitoring is more effective in firms 
that require a higher degree of firm specific knowledge and skills. The researcher follows 
Pantzalis and Park (2009) to divide the sample into top 12 human capital industries and 





effective in reducing the earnings management practices for human intensive capital 
industries. In such industries, the subordinate managers have more importance for the 
production process and are less comparable to outsiders because of their proprietary 
knowledge. Therefore, it is difficult to replace an executive with another, leading to more 
power imposed on the myopic CEO.   
To conclude, internal governance is negatively related to earnings management.  
The findings are robust after controlling for other governance mechanisms and across 
different earnings management models and internal governance measures. This study 
contributes to the literature by examining how internal governance, exercised by 
subordinate managers, diminishes the extent of earnings management practices. This 
governance mechanism has been neglected in the corporate governance literature. 
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Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for S&P 1500 sample firms for the period from 2000 to 
2010. Panel A reports the top management characteristics and internal governance measures. CEO 
Age is the CEO’s age measured in years, Subordinate Manager Age is the mean age of the top 4 
subordinate managers (non-CEO executives) in years, Internal Governance (age difference) is the 
difference between CEO Age and Subordinate Manager Age, CEO pay slice is the ratio of CEO 
pay to the total pay of top 5 managers and is an inverse measure of internal governance. Panel B 
reports the discretionary accruals measures discussed in section 5.2.2. Panel C reports the 
summary statistics for the control variables. A total asset is log of total assets. Std Cash Flow from 
Operations is the standard deviation operations cash flow. Sales growth is the standard deviation 
of Sales growth over the current and previous four years. Std Revenue is the standard deviation of 
sales revenues. Old firm is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is listed in Compustat for 
more than 20 years and zero otherwise. Loss is a dummy variable that is equal one if the firm 
encounters a negative net income on the year t. Leverage is the total liabilities deflated by total 
assets of the firm. Market-to-book is the ratio of market value of the firm to its book value.  
Variable Minimum Mean Median Maximum Std Dev 
Panel A: Top Management Characteristics 
CEO’s Age 31.000 54.108 54.000 90.000 6.599 
Internal Governance (Age 
difference) -29.000 3.914 3.500 36.000 6.907 
Subordinate Managers’ Age 29.000 50.194 50.250 81.000 4.913 
CEO Pay Slice 0.180 0.385 0.386 0.592 0.108 
Panel B: Discretionary Accruals (Earnings Management Measures) 
DA  Jones  1991  0.000 0.555 0.095 108.857 2.975 
Current DAJones  1991  0.000 0.153 0.038 46.595 0.902 
DA  Modified  Jones  0.000 0.556 0.094 109.617 3.020 
Current DA  Modified  Jones  0.000 0.142 0.037 56.382 0.864 
Panel C: Control Variables 
Total Assets -1.911 7.128 6.990 13.590 1.649 
Std Cash Flow from Operations 0.000 0.052 0.037 2.833 0.075 
Sales growth 0.000 0.345 0.129 824.044 7.160 
Std Revenue 0.000 0.154 0.108 7.099 0.208 
Old firms 0.000 0.395 0.000 1.000 0.489 
Loss 0.000 0.225 0.000 1.000 0.418 
Leverage 0.000 0.224 0.191 74.764 0.668 






Internal Governance and Earnings Management 
 
This table reports the regression analysis of internal governance on earnings management 
using the following regression model: 
Discretionary Accrual i,t = β0 + β1 CEO Age i,t + β2 Internal Governance (Age Difference) 
i,t + β3 Total Assets i,t + β4 Cash Flow from Operations i,t +β5 Sales Growth i,t + β6 Revenue 
i,t + β7 Old firms i,t + β8 Loss i,t + β9 Leverage i,t+ β10 Market to Book i,t+ ε i,t 
Discretionary Accrual is the absolute discretionary accruals of Jones, and modified Jones 
models both in the raw and current versions. CEO Age is the CEO’s age measured in years; 
Internal Governance (age difference) is the difference between CEO Age and Subordinate 
Manager Age. A total asset is logarithm of lagged total assets of firm i at year t. Std Cash 
Flow from Operations is the standard deviation operations cash flow. Sales growth is the 
standard deviation of Sales growth over the current and previous four years. Std Revenue is 
the standard deviation of sales revenues. Old firm is a dummy variable that equals one if the 
firm is listed in Compustat for more than 20 years and zero otherwise. Loss is a dummy 
variable that is equal one if the firm encounters a negative net income on the year t. 
Leverage is the lagged total liabilities deflated by total assets of the firm. Market-to-book is 
the ratio of market value of the firm to its book value. The model also control for industry 
and exchange variations by including indicator dummies for each industry and exchange. T-
statistics calculated using White’s corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. 



























CEO Age 0.2501** 0.4002*** 0.2573** 0.4028*** 
 (2.15) (3.42) (2.2) (3.42) Internal Governance  
(Age Difference) -0.0350
** -0.0492*** -0.0348** -0.0483*** 
 (-2.24) (-3.13) (-2.22) (-3.06) Log Lagged Total 
Assets -0.0851
* -0.2406*** -0.0808 -0.2314*** 
 (-1.68) (-4.71) (-1.59) (-4.5) Std. Cash Flow from 
Operations 0.0179 0.0596
*** 0.0188 0.0652*** 
 (1.46) (4.83) (1.53) (5.26) Std. Sales Growth  0.0018 0.0012 0.0019 0.0007 
 (0.22) (0.14) (0.23) (0.09) Std. Dev. Revenue  0.0304*** 0.0680*** 0.0311*** 0.0724*** 
 (2.66) (5.92) (2.71) (6.26) Old firms 0.0244* -0.0028 0.0245* 0.0014 
 (1.86) (-0.21) (1.86) (0.1) Loss -0.0199** -0.0120 -0.0205** -0.0050 
 (-1.99) (-1.19) (-2.04) (-0.49) Lagged Leverage  -0.0016 -0.0154 -0.0014 -0.0128 
 (-0.18) (-1.64) (-0.15) (-1.36) Market to Book 0.0012 0.0000 0.0012 -0.0008 
 (0.15) (0) (0.14) (-0.09) SIC  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exchange Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-square 0.0855 0.0716 0.0838 0.0663 






Internal Governance, CEO pay slice and Earnings Management 
 
This table reports the regression analysis of internal governance on earnings management using the 
following regression model: 
Discretionary Accrual i,t = β0 + β1 CEO Age i,t + β2 Internal Governance (Age Difference) i,t + β3 
CEO Pay Slice i,t + β4 Total Assets i,t + β5 Cash Flow from Operations i,t +β6 Sales Growth i,t + β7 
Revenue i,t + β8 Old firms i,t + β9 Loss i,t + β10 Leverage i,t+ β11 Market to Book i,t+ ε i,t 
Discretionary Accrual is the absolute discretionary accruals of Jones, and modified Jones models 
both in the raw and current versions. CEO Age is the CEO’s age measured in years; Internal 
Governance (age difference) is the difference between CEO Age and Subordinate Manager Age. 
CEO pay slice is the ratio of CEO pay to the total pay of top 5 managers and is an inverse measure 
of internal governance. A total asset is logarithm of lagged total assets of firm i at year t. Std Cash 
Flow from Operations is the standard deviation operations cash flow. Sales growth is the standard 
deviation of Sales growth over the current and previous four years. Std Revenue is the standard 
deviation of sales revenues. Old firm is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is listed in 
Compustat for more than 20 years and zero otherwise. Loss is a dummy variable that is equal one if 
the firm encounters a negative net income on the year t. Leverage is the lagged total liabilities 
deflated by total assets of the firm. Market-to-book is the ratio of market value of the firm to its 
book value. The model also control for industry and exchange variations by including indicator 
dummies for each industry and exchange. T-statistics calculated using White’s corrected standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. Levels of significance are indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, 

























CEO Age 0.2587** 0.4203*** 0.2661** 0.4200*** 
 (2.15) (3.47) (2.20) (3.45) Internal Governance 
(Age Difference) -0.0369
** -0.0517*** -0.0369** -0.0508*** 
 (-2.30) (-3.20) (-2.29) (-3.12) CEO Pay Slice 0.0559* 0.0151 0.0537* 0.0022 
 (1.73) (0.47) (1.66) (0.07) Log Lagged Total Assets -0.0968* -0.2329*** -0.0919* -0.2210*** 
 (-1.81) (-4.33) (-1.71) (-4.08) St. Dev. Cash Flow from 
Operations 0.0158 0.0604
*** 0.0168 0.0665*** 
 (1.24) (4.72) (1.32) (5.18) St. Dev. Sales Growth -0.0006 0.0008 -0.0004 0.0005 
 (-0.07) (0.1) (-0.05) (0.06) St. Dev. Revenue 0.0314*** 0.0715*** 0.0322*** 0.0762*** 
 (2.66) (6) (2.71) (6.35) Old firms 0.0255* -0.0016 0.0256* 0.0028 
 (1.87) (-0.12) (1.88) (0.2) Loss -0.0192* -0.0127 -0.0198* -0.0058 
 (-1.87) (-1.22) (-1.93) (-0.56) Lagged Leverage -0.0019 -0.0165* -0.0017 -0.0139 
 (-0.2) (-1.71) (-0.18) (-1.44) Market to Book 0.0024 -0.0003 0.0023 -0.0011 
 (0.29) (-0.04) (0.28) (-0.13) SIC  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exchange Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-square 0.0863 0.0716 0.0845 0.0661 






Human Capital Industries: Internal Governance and Earnings Management 
 
This table reports the regression analysis of the impact of firm specific learning (human capital) 
on the effectiveness of Internal Governance. To explore this relation, the resercher uses Pantzalis 
and Park (2009) rank of the excess value of human capital for each industry to divide our sample 
firms into top 12 human capital industries and the bottom 12 human capital industries. Panel A 
shows the regressions results for Top 12 Human Capital Industries, while Panel B shows the 
results for the bottom 12 industries. We estimate the following regression model for each group: 
Discretionary Accrual i,t = β0 + β1 CEO Age i,t + β2 Internal Governance (Age Difference) i,t + β3 
CEO Pay Slice i,t + β4 Total Assets i,t + β5 Cash Flow from Operations i,t +β6 Sales Growth i,t + 
β7 Revenue i,t + β8 Old firms i,t + β9 Loss i,t + β10 Leverage i,t+ β11 Market to Book i,t+ ε i,t 
Discretionary Accrual is the absolute discretionary accruals of Jones, and modified Jones models 
both in the raw and current versions. CEO Age is the CEO’s age measured in years; Internal 
Governance (age difference) is the difference between CEO Age and Subordinate Manager Age. 
CEO pay slice is the ratio of CEO pay to the total pay of top 5 managers and is an inverse 
measure of internal governance. A total asset is logarithm of lagged total assets of firm i at year t. 
Std Cash Flow from Operations is the standard deviation operations cash flow. Sales growth is 
the standard deviation of Sales growth over the current and previous four years. Std Revenue is 
the standard deviation of sales revenues. Old firm is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm 
is listed in Compustat for more than 20 years and zero otherwise. Loss is a dummy variable that is 
equal one if the firm encounters a negative net income on the year t. Leverage is the lagged total 
liabilities deflated by total assets of the firm. Market-to-book is the ratio of market value of the 
firm to its book value. The model also control for industry and exchange variations by including 
indicator dummies for each industry and exchange. T-statistics calculated using White’s corrected 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. Levels of significance are indicated by ***, **, and * for 


















Panel A: Top 12 Human Capital Industries 








CEO Age 0.8586*** 1.3569*** 0.8830*** 1.3839*** 
 (2.83) (4.5) (2.91) (4.58) Internal Governance 
(Age Difference) -0.1051
*** -0.1571*** -0.1071*** -0.1596*** 
 (-2.66) (-4.00) (-2.7) (-4.06) 
CEO Pay Slice 0.1565* 0.0600 0.1474* 0.0150 
 (1.90) (0.73) (1.79) (0.18) 
Log Lagged Total Assets -0.1130 -0.2831** -0.1015 -0.2555** 
 (-0.97) (-2.45) (-0.87) (-2.21) 
St. Dev. Cash Flow from 
Operations 0.0027 0.0474 0.0029 0.0488 
 (0.09) (1.52) (0.09) (1.56) 
St. Dev. Sales Growth 0.0014 0.0100 0.0023 0.0070 
 (0.07) (0.5) (0.12) (0.36) 
St. Dev. Revenue 0.0961*** 0.2002*** 0.1061*** 0.2295*** 
 (3.36) (7.04) (3.6) (7.83) 
Old firms 0.0252 -0.0268 0.0240 -0.0208 
 (0.8) (-0.86) (0.76) (-0.67) 
Loss -0.0510** -0.0259 -0.0512** -0.0101 
 (-2.12) (-1.09) (-2.13) (-0.42) 
Lagged Leverage -0.0041 -0.0362 -0.0039 -0.0340 
 (-0.17) (-1.52) (-0.16) (-1.43) 
Market to Book -0.0087 -0.0131 -0.0094 -0.0159 
 (-0.45) (-0.68) (-0.48) (-0.82) 
SIC  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exchange Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-square 0.0829 0.0915 0.0820 0.0894 














Panel B: Bottom 12 Human Capital Industries 








CEO Age -0.4369* 0.1570 -0.4651* 0.0839 
 (-1.71) (0.65) (-1.81) (0.35) Internal Governance 
(Age Difference) 0.0453 -0.0168 0.0470 -0.0103 
 (1.34) (-0.52) (1.37) (-0.32) 
CEO Pay Slice -0.0629 -0.1471** -0.0569 -0.1378** 
 (-0.93) (-2.28) (-0.83) (-2.14) 
Log Lagged Total Assets -0.3396** -0.5238*** -0.3382** -0.5364*** 
 (-2.57) (-4.16) (-2.54) (-4.27) 
St. Dev. Cash Flow from 
Operations 0.0410 0.1861
*** 0.0398 0.1954*** 
 (1.26) (6) (1.21) (6.33) 
St. Dev. Sales Growth 0.0151 0.0743*** 0.0174 0.0883*** 
 (0.64) (3.32) (0.74) (3.96) 
St. Dev. Revenue 0.0101 0.0873*** 0.0081 0.0862*** 
 (0.34) (3.09) (0.27) (3.07) 
Old firms -0.0255 0.0394 -0.0260 0.0368 
 (-0.89) (1.45) (-0.9) (1.36) 
Loss -0.0099 0.0019 -0.0114 0.0027 
 (-0.46) (0.09) (-0.52) (0.13) 
Lagged Leverage 0.0182 -0.0921*** 0.0245 -0.0801** 
 (0.56) (-2.96) (0.74) (-2.57) 
Market to Book 0.0379** 0.0462*** 0.0367** 0.0426** 
 (2.12) (2.71) (2.04) (2.51) 
SIC  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exchange Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-square 0.2112 0.2857 0.2110 0.2995 







Internal Governance, Conventional Governance and Earnings Management 
 
This table reports the regression analysis between the internal governance and earning 
management after controlling for conventional governance matrices. To explore this relation, 
estimate the following regression model for each group: 
Discretionary  accruals  !,!
=   𝛽! + 𝛽!  𝐶𝐸𝑂!𝑠  𝐴𝑔𝑒!,! +   𝛽!  𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙  𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒!,! 𝐴𝑔𝑒  𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒
+   𝛽!  CEO  Pay  Slice!,! +   𝛽!𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙  𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝!,! + 𝛽!  𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦
+   𝛽!  𝐷𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝  +  𝛽!  𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒!,! +   𝛽!  𝑀𝑇𝐵!,! +   𝛽!  𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠  𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ!,!   
+ 𝛽!"  𝑆𝑡𝑑  𝑅𝑒𝑣!,! + 𝛽!!  𝑆𝑡𝑑  𝐶𝐹𝑂!.! + 𝛽!"  𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 +   𝛽!"  𝑂𝑙𝑑  𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠  !
+   𝛽!"𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠! + 𝑆𝐼𝐶! + 𝐸𝑋𝐶𝐻! +     𝜀!,!  
Discretionary Accrual is the absolute discretionary accruals of Jones, and modified Jones models 
both in the raw and current versions. CEO Age is the CEO’s age measured in years; Internal 
Governance (age difference) is the difference between CEO Age and Subordinate Manager Age. 
CEO pay slice is the ratio of CEO pay to the total pay of top 5 managers and is an inverse 
measure of internal governance. Institutional ownership as the percentage of shares owned by 
intuitional investors. Democracy variable to 1 if the firm scored 6 or below in Gompers et al., 
(2003) governance index and 0 otherwise. Dictatorship is a dummy variable equal to one if it 
score 13 or more in GIM governance index, otherwise dictatorship is equal to zero. A total asset 
is logarithm of lagged total assets of firm i at year t. Std Cash Flow from Operations is the 
standard deviation operations cash flow. Sales growth is the standard deviation of Sales growth 
over the current and previous four years. Std Revenue is the standard deviation of sales revenues. 
Old firm is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is listed in Compustat for more than 20 
years and zero otherwise. Loss is a dummy variable that is equal one if the firm encounters a 
negative net income on the year t. Leverage is the lagged total liabilities deflated by total assets of 
the firm. Market-to-book is the ratio of market value of the firm to its book value. The model also 
control for industry and exchange variations by including indicator dummies for each industry 
and exchange. In Panel B, following Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), we include another two 
other GIM governance categories in the regression model. T-statistics calculated using White’s 
corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. Levels of significance are indicated by ***, 















Panel A     








CEO Age 0.2647** 0.4310*** 0.2732** 0.4331*** 
 (2.18) (3.51) (2.24) (3.52) Internal Governance 
(Age Difference) -0.0368
** -0.0532*** -0.0369** -0.0526*** 
 (-2.26) (-3.25) (-2.26) (-3.2) 
CEO Pay Slice 0.0579* 0.0117 0.0556* -0.0022 
 (1.76) (0.35) (1.69) (-0.07) 
Institutional Ownership -0.0359 0.0104 -0.0329 0.0123 
 (-0.97) (0.28) (-0.89) (0.33) 
G<=6 (Democracy) 0.0146 0.0324** 0.0152 0.0324** 
 (0.99) (2.17) (1.02) (2.15) 
13<= G (dictatorship) 0.0028 -0.0025 0.0031 -0.0044 
 (0.27) (-0.24) (0.3) (-0.42) 
Log Lagged Total Assets -0.0692 -0.1959*** -0.0660 -0.1910*** 
 (-1.23) (-3.45) (-1.17) (-3.35) 
St. Dev. Cash Flow from 
Operations 0.0178 0.0613
*** 0.0189 0.0677*** 
 (1.34) (4.58) (1.42) (5.04) 
St. Dev. Sales Growth -0.0005 0.0011 -0.0004 0.0004 
 (-0.06) (0.13) (-0.04) (0.05) 
St. Dev. Revenue 0.0321*** 0.0723*** 0.0328*** 0.0763*** 
 (2.67) (5.97) (2.71) (6.26) 
Old firms 0.0255* 0.0059 0.0257* 0.0113 
 (1.81) (0.42) (1.82) (0.79) 
Loss -0.0179* -0.0075 -0.0186* -0.0021 
 (-1.73) (-0.71) (-1.79) (-0.2) 
Lagged Leverage -0.0233 -0.0461*** -0.0205 -0.0251* 
 (-1.59) (-3.12) (-1.4) (-1.69) 
Market to Book 0.0025 -0.0002 0.0024 -0.0013 
 (0.3) (-0.03) (0.29) (-0.15) 
SIC  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exchange Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-square 0.0866 0.0716 0.0848 0.0656 























CEO Age 0.2648** 0.4320*** 0.2733** 0.4345*** 
 (2.17) (3.52) (2.24) (3.52) Internal Governance 
(Age Difference) -0.0368
** -0.0533*** -0.0369** -0.0527*** 
 (-2.26) (-3.26) (-2.26) (-3.2) 
CEO Pay Slice 0.0579* 0.0115 0.0556* -0.0025 
 (1.76) (0.35) (1.69) (-0.07) 
Institutional Ownership -0.0359 0.0103 -0.0329 0.0122 
 (-0.97) (0.28) (-0.89) (0.33) 
G<=6 (Democracy) 0.0533 -0.0916 0.0389 -0.1112 
 (0.22) (-0.38) (0.16) (-0.46) 
7<=G<=9 0.0233 -0.0766 0.0142 -0.0890 
 (0.16) (-0.52) (0.1) (-0.6) 
10<=G<=12 0.0217 -0.0672 0.0133 -0.0775 
 (0.16) (-0.5) (0.1) (-0.57) 
13<= G (dictatorship) 0.0155 -0.0432 0.0109 -0.0515 
 (0.2) (-0.55) (0.14) (-0.65) 
Log Lagged Total Assets -0.0692 -0.1960*** -0.0660 -0.1911*** 
 (-1.23) (-3.46) (-1.17) (-3.35) 
St. Dev. Cash Flow from Operations 0.0178 0.0613*** 0.0189 0.0677*** 
 (1.34) (4.58) (1.42) (5.04) 
St. Dev. Sales Growth -0.0005 0.0011 -0.0004 0.0004 
 (-0.06) (0.13) (-0.04) (0.05) 
St. Dev. Revenue 0.0321*** 0.0723*** 0.0328*** 0.0763*** 
 (2.67) (5.97) (2.71) (6.26) 
Old firms 0.0254* 0.0057 0.0257* 0.0109 
 (1.8) (0.4) (1.82) (0.76) 
Loss -0.0179* -0.0075 -0.0186* -0.0021 
 (-1.73) (-0.71) (-1.79) (-0.2) 
Lagged Leverage -0.0233 -0.0460*** -0.0205 -0.0250* 
 (-1.59) (-3.12) (-1.39) (-1.68) 
Market to Book 0.0025 -0.0003 0.0024 -0.0014 
 (0.3) (-0.03) (0.29) (-0.16) 
R-square 0.0865 0.0715 0.0848 0.0656 
No. Obs. 13229 13247 13185 13203 
 
 
